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ENDA BEFORE IT STARTS: SECTION 5 OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE AVAILABII TY OF DAMAGES AWARDS
TO GAY STATE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT NON-
DISCRIMINATION ACT
WILLIAM D. ARAIzA*
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett further circumscribed
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
recent decisions in this area insist that enforcement legislation be
congruent and proportional to the constitutional violations sought to
be remedied. The specter of reduced leeway for congressional
enforcement authority requires Congress to approach such federal
legislation carefully. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),
proposed legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, provides an interesting case study of the Court's recent
Section 5 jurisprudence. This Article, after outlining historic and
current Section 5 standards, uses Garrett as a guide to examine whether
the Supreme Court would uphold ENDA's provision allowing state
employees to sue their employers for certain types of retrospective
relief. The Article both argues that ENDA is a valid expression of
Congress' Section 5 power and provides strategies for navigating the
increasingly narrow confines of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power to provide critical employment protections.
In February 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,' holding that Ti-
tle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 exceeded Con-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes to thank Cath-
erine Fisk, Evan Gerstmann, Eve Hill, David Leonard, and Georgene Vairo for reading and
commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and David Clifford for fine research assistance.
1121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1990). The ADA prohibits employment discrimination
against the disabled.
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gress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Garrett marked
a continuation of the Court's recent practice of closely scrutinizing
federal legislation based on Congress' power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, the so-called "Section 5 power."4 This line of
cases,5 most decided by the same 5-4 majority,6 represents a sustained
attempt by the Court to circumscribe what had previously been Con-
gress' extremely broad enforcement power, reviewed deferentially by
courts.7 The cases all feature the Court's new insistence that such en-
forcement legislation demonstrate "congruence and proportionality"
to the constitutional violations sought to be remedied.8 In turn, those
violations must either appear likely to the Court (because, for exam-
3 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have the power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
4 See id.; see, e.g., infia note 5 and accompanying text.
5 See generally Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. - Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
6 The exception was the first case in the series, City of Boerne. 521 U.S. at 507-66. The
majority in CitY of Boerne included ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy (the author),
Justice Thomas, and, for most of the opinion,Justice Scalia. These fourJustices have been
members of the five-Justice majority in the other recent Section 5 cases. See, e.g., Fla. Pie-
paid, 527 U.S. at 629. The fifth member of that group, Justice O'Conno, dissented in CitV
ofBoerne, although she agreed with the majority's Section 5 analysis. See 521 U.S. at 544,
545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The City of Boerne majority also included Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg, both of whom have dissented in subsequent Section 5 cases. See id. at 5 10;
see also, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691-94. The line-up in City of Boerne was skewed by
the Justices' disagreement over the proper standard for analyzing the underlying right that
Congress was purporting to enforce, the Free Exercise Clause, as incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
7 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (holding that the proper
standard for reviewing a congressional assertion of its Section 5 authority is whether the
Court could perceive a basis for Congress' decision that enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be firthered by the challenged statute); id. at 653 (stating that the
scope of Congress' discretion under the Section 5 power was as broad as that under the
Commerce Clause and other Article I grants of authority when combined with the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (using
the same analysis for Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment). The Court
has indicated that the inquiry is the same for Congress' powers to enforce both the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Bd. of Tl. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct.
955, 967 n.8 (2001); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (noting the identity of the tests involving tile
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Congress'
Article I powers); see also James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924)
(employing the same analysis for Congress' power to enforce the Eighteenth Amend-
ment).
8 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639; City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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ple, they involve discrimination on some disfavored ground such as
race) or because Congress has revealed a pattern and practice of un-
constitutional conduct by the states.9
While these cases all point in the same direction with regard to
the reduced leeway the Court now gives such legislation, each case
deals with the vindication of a right that has a different type and level
of grounding in the Constitution.'0 City of Boerne v. Flores1l dealt with
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).12 RFRA attempted to
protect religious freedom, a highly protected right explicitly en-
shrined in the Constitution and incorporated against the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.13 RFRA attempted to
undo the effects of a then-recent Supreme Court decision that
identified a lower level of scrutiny as appropriate for free exercise
claims.14 The Court struck RFRA down, concluding that the statute
was simply an attempt to reinterpret the Constitution rather than pro-
tect values the Court had identified in its free exercise jurispru-
dence. 15
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank also considered a statute
guarding against state deprivations of a due process right, the prop-
erty right in a patent.' 6 In that case, the Court struck the statute down
because Congress had not demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct justifying the statutory remedy.17 The companion case, College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, considered whether the Lanham Act's
9 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 964; Kimel 528 U.S. at 88-89; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640; City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32.10 See, e.g., Kime4 528 U.S. at 62; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
11521 U.S. at 507.
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
1s See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 519.
14 In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882, 883 (1990), the Court significantly reduced the scope of the protection granted relig-
ious expression under the Free Exercise Clause, holding that a generally applicable law
that incidentally burdened religious expression would be subjected only to a very deferen-
tial test. In so doing, the Court rejected the test approach set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), in which the Court subjected such laws to strict scrutiny, to the extent
they substantially burdened religious expression. RFRA attempted to overturn the result in
Smith by mandating the strict scrutiny test (narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov-
ernment interest) before state and local governments could take actions that substantially
burdened religious expression. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
15 See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in City
of Boerne).16 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
17 See inlfra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in For-
ida Prepaid).
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prohibition on false advertising bestowed on competitors of the al-
leged false advertiser a property right to be free from such unfair
competition.'8 The Court rejected the argument that such a right ex-
isted in the Due Process Clause and thus concluded that the false ad-
vertising prohibition was not "appropriate" Section 5 legislation. 19
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents dealt with age discrimination, a
claim made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 However, the Court has held that age classifications
are subject only to the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny-the
well-known "rational basis" test-and has never struck down an age
classification. 21 As Congress did not demonstrate actual instances of
state age-related employment discrimination that would rise to the
level of constitutional violations, the Court held that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) application to the states
exceeded Congress' Section 5 authority.22
Garrett completes the set of cases, as it deals with a right, an equal
protection-based right against disability-based employment discrimi-
nation, that again receives only rational basis scrutiny.23 Unlike age
discrimination, however, disability discrimination (at least mental dis-
ability discrimination) has been found unconstitutional by the Court
in one case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center24 While Cleburne
has apparently not heralded a new day of heightened judicial solici-
tude for the rights of the disabled, mentally or otherwise, 25 there is at
least precedent on the books for finding such discrimination uncon-
stitutional. Nevertheless, as in Kimel, the Garrett Court held that Con-
gress had not found sufficient evidence of states' unconstitutional
conduct justifying the broad prohibitions in the statute and struck
18 526 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
19 See id. at 672-75.
20 See generally 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
21 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)). See gener-
ally Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Retirement N% Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976) (per cuiam).
22 See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in
Kimel).
2-3 121 S. Ct. 955,963,964 (2000); see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985) (rejecting the application of heightened scrutiny to discrimina-
tion based on mental disability).
24 473 U.S. at 432.
25 See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28 (1993) (upholding a statute that
treated persons with mental retardation less favorably than those with mental illness).
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down application to the states of the Americans with Disabilities Act's
(ADA) employment provisions.26
With the basic doctrine in place (the "congruence and propor-
tionality" standard, the requirement that actual unconstitutional con-
duct be identified or at least obvious, and, more generally, stricter ju-
dicial scrutiny), and with examples of its application to the different
types of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment,27 eyes
should now turn to mapping the terrain of future challenges to Sec-
tion 5 legislation. The proposed federal ban on employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation presents an interesting Sec-
tion 5 question. Such proposed legislation (in recent years entitled
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, or "ENDA"), has been in-
troduced in Congress every year since 199428 and has gathered more
support each time. 29 While the attitude of the Bush administration is
unclear,30 there is at least a possibility that the bill will be enacted in
the next several years.31 Such a law would almost assuredly be consti-
tutional as an expression of Congress' commerce power, even after
the Court's recent retrenchments in this area.32 As such, it could also
26 See infra notes 104-127 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in
Garrett).
27 Obviously this is an oversimplification. Still, the basic outlines are now present: City
of Boerne considered a fundamental due process right; College Savings Bank considered a
right that was too tenuously linked to constitutionally protected "property" interests to be
protected by the Due Process Clause; Kimel considered an equal protection argument that
the Court had consistently rejected; and, Garrett considered one that the Court normally
rejected, but had on one occasion accepted. See generally Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Say.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The situation the Court has not addressed since City
of Boerne is legislation addressing an equal protection classification (such as gender or
race) in which the Court has required application of strict judicial scrutiny.
28ENDAwas introduced in the 103d Congress. SeeH.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994).
29 See, e.g., infra note 31 and accompanying text.
30 The Republican Platform states that "we do not believe sexual preference should be
given special legal protection or standing in law." Republican Platform 2000, Renewing
America's Purpose Together (2000), at http://vw.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/
republican/features/platform.00/#19 (last visited Nov. 30, 2001).
31 ENDA was first introduced in the 103d Congress on June 23, 1994 and has been re-
introduced every year since in at least one house. Most years the bill has died in commit-
tee; however, in 1996 the bill received its first floor vote and came within one vote of pas-
sage in the Senate. OnJuly 31, 2001, the bill was reintroduced. As of September 28, 2001,
the bill had forty-three co-sponsors in the Senate and 184 in the House, with members of
both political parties serving as cosponsors.
32 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (striking down 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (1994) as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, but noting
that the commerce power allows Congress to enact laws regulating activities that substan-
2002]
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constitutionally be applied to the states, under the authority of Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3 3 The issue, analogous to
those raised in Kirnel and Garrett, would be whether plaintiffs (in this
case, lesbian and gay state employees) could sue their state/employer
for retrospective relief such as a damages award.3 Such retrospective
relief against a state cannot be authorized pursuant to a statute
justified as an expression of Congress' Article I powers.35 Thus, in or-
der for such employees to collect damages, the statute would have to
be supportable as an expression of Congress' Section 5 power.3 6
Thus, the question: Would ENDA be an appropriate enforcement
statute under current Supreme Court doctrine? Part I of this Article
examines the Supreme Court's Section 5 jurisprudence, paying spe-
cial attention to the recent line of cases beginning with City of Boerne.
Part II of this Article applies the Court's current approach to Section
5 legislation to the versions of ENDA introduced in recent congres-
sional sessions.37 It is clear that the current approach requires an ex-
amination of the suspicion with which the Court has regarded the
underlying conduct being restricted. Applying that test to ENDA will
require examining how seriously the Court is concerned about dis-
tially affect interstate commerce and determining that the "substantial effects" test author-
izes regulation of economic activity that in the aggregate substantially affects interstate
commerce); Unites States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (striking down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, but noting the same congressional power as explained in
Mlorlison).
33 See 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985) (holding that generally applicable laws can be con-
stitutionally applied to the states in their capacity as participants in the national economy).
The recent "anti-commandeering" cases do not disturb that result; they are more con-
cerned with federal attempts to control the states in their capacities as governments. Com-
pare generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (suiking down federal attempt to
direct a state's law enforcement operations) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992) (striking down federal attempts to direct a state's legislative agenda) with Reno v.
Condon, 526 U.S. 1111 (1999) (upholding a statute regulating the commerce in driver's
license information, as it did not require the states to regulate their citizens in any particu-
lar way).
3- CompareAlbemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (holding back pay
to be an integral part of the "primary objective" of Title VII).
35 See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Indeed, the Court
has also held that Article I does not empower Congress to make states suable for retrospec-
tive relief in their own courts. SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 406, 430-31 (1999).
36 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Section 5 gives
Congress the power to abrogate state immunity from suits seeking retrospective relief).
37 See S. 1284, 107th Cong. § 501 (2001); S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2355, 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1999); S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2238, 103d
Cong. (1994). Because ENDA is not yet law, this Article will cite from different versions of
ENDA, suggesting the implications if an ultimately enacted ENDA statute contained or
lacked that particular type of provision.
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crimination against gays and lesbians. This, in turn, leads us to con-
sider Romer v. Evans.38 The task here will be to attempt to "translate"
Romer into Section 5 language, much as the Court in Garrett attempted
to translate Cleburne.39 After considering whether Romer means that all
sexual orientation discrimination in employment is constitutionally
irrational, and reaching an equivocal conclusion, Part II continues by
examining whether ENDA is sufficiently limited so as to prohibit only
that discrimination which the Court would in fact consider unconsti-
tutional. Assuming that ENDA does in fact go beyond what the Con-
stitution commands, Part II concludes by considering whether ENDA
constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation, perhaps going be-
yond what equal protection requires but sufficiently related to those
limits as to satisfy the Court's test of "congruence and proportional-
ity." Part I of this Article takes a more prescriptive tone. Since ENDA
has not yet been enacted, its proponents in Congress may well wish to
consider Garrett and the other Section 5 cases as they draft new ver-
sions of the bill. Part IlI offers some unsolicited advice for those in-
terested in ENDA's enactment, suggesting ways in which the bill's
drafting, and especially its fact-finding, may maximize chances for its
survival as an appropriate expression of Congress' Section 5 power. In
Part IV, the Article concludes by offering some general thoughts on
the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence, based on the results of the
foregoing analysis of ENDA as legislation designed to ensure the
equal protection rights of gay men and lesbians.40
I. THE SuPREME CoURT's SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Court's Section 5Jurisprudence Before City of Boerne
The history of the modern Court's interpretation of the Section
5 power is a familiar one and will be recounted only briefly here. In
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld as a valid exercise of the Sec-
517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2, a Colorado constitu-
tional provision prohibiting the state or its subdivisions from banning discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation).
S9 SeeBd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala.v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963-64 (2001).
40 For convenience, this Article uses the term "homosexual" and "gay" interchangably,
to denote gay, lesbian, or bisexual status or conduct (depending on the context). The
analysis in this Article does not purport to address the employment rights of transgen-
dered people as those rights might be protected by the Constitution, ENDA, or extant
federal antidiscrimination law, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination based on sex.
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tion 5 power a provision of the Voting Rights Act that allowed gradu-
ates of the sixth grade of accredited Spanish-language schools in
Puerto Rico to vote, notwithstanding state English-literacy
qualification tests.41 Even though the Court had previously held that
such literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,42 the
Court concluded that the statute was an appropriate use of Congress'
Section 5 power.43 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Brennan
enunciated an extremely deferential test for Section 5 legislation.
Quoting directly from McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court held that the
scope of the Section 5 power was governed by the same broad test ap-
plicable to exercises of Congress' Article I power: "'Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional.' 44 In a case decided the same year as
Morgan, the Court had enunciated that same standard as governing
the scope of Congress' analogous power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.45
Turning to the merits, the Court put forth two justifications for
upholding the statute. First, providing voting rights for Puerto Ricans
might be thought to assist in ensuring equal responsiveness to their
concerns from the political process.46 Second, and more controver-
sially, the Court stated that Congress may reasonably have thought
that the English literacy test itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause, despite what the Court had itself held several years before.4 7
This potentially revolutionary grant of interpretive power to Congress
elicited a sharp dissent from Justice Harlan 48 and has been controver-
sial ever since.49 Still, Morgan laid the foundation for two principles of
41 384 U.S 641, 652 (1966).
42 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1959).
43 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966).
44 Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)); see
also id. ("By including section five the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Anendment, the same broad powers expressed in
the Necessary and Proper Clause.").
45 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); see also Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 651 (citing South Carolina for the McCulloch proposition).
46 See Moigan, 384 U.S. at 652-53.
47 See id. at 653-56.
48 See id. at 659, 668-70 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
49 See, e.g., EEOC -. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-64 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that application of the Age Discrimination Employment Act to state employers
was authorized by neither the Commerce Clause not as a provision enforcing Section 5 of
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the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence: deferential review of the appro-
priateness of Section 5 legislation and a broad conception of what the
Section 5 power allows Congress to do.
Retrenchment was quick in coming. Four years later, in Oregon v.
Mitchell, a severely fractured Court was unable to agree on a rationale
for upholding Congress' decision to lower the voting age to eighteen
in federal elections, while striking down Congress' decision to do the
same with regard to state elections.50 Justice Black, the fifth vote for
both of these holdings, tied his Section 5 analysis to the existence of
other textual authority for Congress to act in this area.51 Thus, as
other parts of the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate
elections for federal offices,52 Justice Black concluded that Congress
had greater power under Section 5 to go beyond what he saw as the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' overriding concern with race
discrimination. 53 By contrast, he was not willing to grant Congress
such broad power under its authority to "enforce" the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments when it was acting in an area not directly ad-
dressed by those provisions.54 Justice Harlan, writing for himself only,
would have struck the statute down as applied to both federal and
state elections.55 He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
address the issue of voting rights56 and questioned Morgan's deferen-
tial standard for reviewing Section 5 enactments. 57 Justice Stewart,
joined by two other Justices, also would have struck down both appli-
cations of the statute.58 He agreed withJustice Black that the Constitu-
tion gave the states the authority to regulate elections and refused to
the Fourteenth Amendment and specifically critiquing the theory that Congress can ex-
pand Fourteenth Amendment rights via Section 5); Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 91, 106 (1966) (describing
this rationale as "a strikingly novel form ofjudicial deference to congressional power").
50 See generally 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Other voting access provisions were upheld by
larger majorities in this case.
51 See generally id.
52 See id. at 119-24 (opinion of Black,J.).
53 Seeid. at 126-30 (opinion of BlackJ.).
54 See id. at 130 (opinion of BlackJ.).
m See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 152 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 See id. at 152, 200 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 212,
213 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the only pos-
sible Section 5 justification for the statute lay in the possibility that states were engaged in
invidious discrimination against 18-to-21 year-olds and rejecting that argument).
57 See id. at 152, 204-09 (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).5 Id. at 281 (StewartJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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give Morgan a broad reading.59 Thus, in Oregon, five Justices ques-
tioned the scope of the Section 5 power as construed in Morgan.60
Nevertheless, Oregon remains a weak precedent given its fractured na-
ture and the special circumstances of the case, namely, Articles I and
II's arguably clear delegation of the election regulation power to the
states and the explicit conclusion of at least two Justices that the Four-
teenth Amendment simply had nothing to say about age-based dis-
crimination in voting.61
Ten years after Oregon, the Court in City of Rome v. United States
upheld Congress' power under the enforcement provision of the Fif-
teenth Amendment to prohibit changes in state election laws that had
either the purpose or the effect of diluting black voting strength. 62
The same day the Court decided City of Rome, it also held that state
action, in order to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, had to evince
purposeful discrimination.63 In allowing Congress to prohibit a prac-
tice the Court had just held to be constitutional, the City of Rome
Court reasoned that Congress might have found that disparate impact
suggested discriminatory intent but that such intent might be difficult
to prove. 64 Thus, according to the Court, Congress had the power to
craft a prophylactic rule-what Laurence Tribe has described as "al-
most a rule of evidence"65-that prohibited electoral changes with
racially disparate impact because so many of those changes might
59 See id. at 281, 285-92, 294, 296 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (viewing Morgan as giving congressional power under Section 5 "the furthest possible
legitimate reach").
0 See id. at 112. Other commentators disagree, finding in Oregon an implicit
reaffirmation of Morgan's broad power. See, e.g., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of Red
Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589, 718-23
(1996).
61 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also supra note 58 and accompany-
ing text. Justice Brennan, the author of Morgan, wrote in Oregon for himself and two other
Justices and would have upheld the statute's application to both federal and state elec-
tions. See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
He characterized Morgan as resting on the superior fact finding capabilities of Congress
when compared with those of the judiciary. See id. at 248-50 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas would also have upheld the statute in its en-
tirety. See id. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also relied
on Morgan and would have applied that case's deferential standard of review to Congress'
decision that lowering the voting age was appropriate in order to secure equal protection.
See id. at 141-44 (Douglas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
63 See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
64 See Citv of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (1980).
6 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-14, at 338 (2d ed.
1988).
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have been motivated by racial discriminatory intent 66 This rationale
can be understood as a "wider net" theory, in which a wider net of
conduct might be prohibited than that which was actually unconstitu-
tional in order to be sure to catch all actual constitutional violations.
According to the City of Rome Court, such a rationale derived naturally
from Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.67
Thus, in 1997 when the Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores it
had before it a tradition of broad readings of Congress' enforcement
power. Morgan had been the high-water mark, with its intimation that
Congress had the power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.68
But even leaving that particular holding aside, the general standard of
deference enunciated in Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and
the wider net concept endorsed in City of Rome, all pointed to congres-
sional power to go beyond the actual guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment when crafting remedial or deterrent legislation and
broad discretion to decide on the need for such legislation. City of
Boerne, however, ushered in a new era.69
B. The Change Wrought by City of Boerne
Starting with City of Boerne, the Court began to cut back on the
deference it had previously given to Congress' decisions to use its Sec-
tion 5 power.70 In City of Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA, which
purported to enforce the Due Process Clause's guarantee of free relig-
ious expression, incorporated from the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.7t RFRA accomplished this by prohibiting state and
local governments from substantially burdening religious exercise,
even via a generally applicable law that did not single out religious
expression, unless the burden was justifiable under the strict scrutiny
test of narrow tailoring and a compelling government interest.72 The
strict scrutiny test imposed by RFRA was similar to the Court's own
6 See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 117.
67 See 446 U.S. at 173-78. It bears repeating that the Court has consistently viewed the
enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to be identical,
except of course for the subject matter to which such enforcement legislation can be ad-
dressed. See cases cited supra note 7.
6 384 U.S. 641,650 (1966).
69 See discussion infta Part I.B.
70 See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
71 See id. at 519.
72 See id. at 515 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994)).
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rule for deciding free exercise cases between 1963 and 1990, when it
replaced it with a test that was much less demanding.73
In striking down RFRA, the Court enunciated principles that it
has since applied several times when deciding the scope of the Sec-
tion 5 power. Most importantly, the Court required, for the first time,
that legislation defended as an exercise of the Section 5 power reflect
a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."74 The Court
held that RFRA failed this test.75 First, in discussing congruence, 76 it
concluded that the legislative record revealed no examples of laws
enacted because of religious bigotry, which the Court identified as the
basic evil sought to be prevented by the Free Exercise Clause. 77 The
record did reveal examples of laws burdening religious exercise, but
these were only tangential to the value the Court had identified in the
Free Exercise Clause and thus the value Congress was authorized to
protect through its Section 5 power.78 The Court also held that RFRA
was not proportional to any violations that might exist, since it was not
the case that many actions thereby prohibited would have been un-
constitutional. 79 Thus, the Court distinguished RFRA from statutes
such as the Voting Rights Act, which was upheld in cases such as City of
Rome on the "wider net" theory discussed above. 80 Given this lack of
proportionality, the City of Boerne Court concluded that RFRA was
73 Indeed, the Court saw in RFRA an attempt to move the law even beyond the Court's
pre-Smithjurisprudence, as set forth in Shebert v. twrner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), toward an
even more accommodating attitude toward religion. See City of Boernle, 521 U.S. at 535
(RFRA "imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement-a requirement that
was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify."). See generally Em-
ployment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). With re-
spect to the less demanding test, see, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. A fuller explanation of
the Smith Court's analysis and rejection of Sherbert's strict scrutiny test is provided in Ci1Y of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16.
74 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
75 Id. at 530-34.
76 This Article will not focus on the distinction, whatever it may be, between the "con-
gruence" and "proportionality" requirements. As will become clear, both requirements
speak to the same basic concern about the fit between the statute's limits on state action
and the constitutional violation it seeks to remedy.
77 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32, 535.
78 See id. at 531.
79 See id. at 532.
80 See id. at 530-32; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 117, 177 (1980); TRIBE,
supra note 65.
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simply an attempt to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, not to
enforce it.81
Thus, City of Boerne establishes several points about the Court's
modern Section 5 jurisprudence. Most basically, that jurisprudence
entails much more careful judicial scrutiny than previously needed. In
particular, the Court now requires some measure of fit between statu-
tory means and the constitutional violations supplying their underly-
ing rationale. This fit must include at least some evidence of violations
of the underlying constitutional right. For example, in City of Boerne
the Court noted that Congress did not find examples of states engag-
ing in religious bigotry (the underlying value in the Free Exercise
Clause, at least under Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith).82 This "fit" requirement also seems to de-
mand at least some rationale for the scope of the remedial statute that
is linked to violations of the underlying right. In City of Boerne, the
Court noted that most practices outlawed by RFRA would probably be
constitutional and thus criticized the statute for sweeping too
broadly.8 3 These two sides of the "fit" requirement are closely related,
of course: If the statute addressed an area where there was little evi-
dence of unconstitutional conduct, it would follow that the statute
would also be overly broad in relation to those underlying violations.
C. Florida Prepaid and Kimel: Variations on the Theme
In Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank and Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents, the Court reaffirmed the approach it crafted in City of
Boerne.84 The circumstances of each case, however, led the Court to
apply that approach in slightly different ways.
81 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533, 534 (stating, after discussing the stringency of the
strict scrutiny standard codified in RFRA, that "[w]e make these observations not to rear-
gue the position of the majority in Smith [against using strict scrutiny in this area] but to
illustrate the substantive alteration of its holding attempted by RFRA").
82 See id. at 530, 531.
83 See id. at 532.
84 College Savings Bank, while also rejecting Section 5 as a valid basis for the challenged
statute, was decided on an issue preliminary to the City of Boerne analysis. See generally Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In College Savings Bank, the Court held that the Lanham Act's
prohibition on false advertising did not give businesses a property right in avoiding the
unfair competition such false advertising might cause. See 527 U.S. at 673. Because there
was no property interest, and thus no right under the Due Process Clause, the Court did
not have to consider whether the statute was an appropriate means for enforcing such a
right. See id. at 675. In the same term the Court decided Kime4 it also decided United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), in which it held, inter alia, that the federal Violence
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1. Florida Prepaid
The issue in Florida Prepaid was Congress' amendment to federal
patent law, making states liable for infringement suits. 85 The Court
held that the law was not an appropriate use of Congress' Section 5
power.86 The Court made explicit what it had suggested in City of
Boerne; namely, that Section 5 requires Congress both to identify the
conduct actually violating the Fourteenth Amendment (in this case,
the Due Process Clause) and to tailor its legislative scheme to remedy-
ing or preventing such violations.87 Applying these requirements, the
Court in Florida Prepaid concluded that Congress had failed to identify
such violations, which the Court defined as not just patent infringe-
ments, but patent infringements that deprived the patent holder of
propertys without due process.8 9 Examining the record, the Court
concluded that "Congress appears to have enacted [the statute] in
response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that
do not necessarily violate the Constitution. ' 0 The Court also found
fault with the proportionality of the statute, concluding that it was not
tailored to focus on unconstitutional conduct, but instead made states
liable whenever they infringed on a patent, regardless of, for example,
whether the infringement was merely negligent (and thus not a "dep-
rivation" of property) or whether the state provided remedies for dep-
rivations (and thus did not fail to provide "due process").91 Tellingly,
the Court distinguished earlier precedent, namely, South Carolina, on
the ground that the statute upheld in that case did include various
Against Women Act (VAWA) did not constitute appropriate remedial legislation under
Section 5. VAWA provided the victim of a gender-based crime of violence a private right of
action against her attacker. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). In holding that the statute was not
appropriate Section 5 legislation, the Court concluded that it failed the congruence and
proportionality test because it was directed not at state action, but at the action of private
parties (the attackers). See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26. Because VAWA directed the rem-
edy towards private parties, and the statutes in City ofBoerne, Kimel, Florida Prepaid, Garrett,
and ENDA itself proscribe a remedy directed at the state actor, Morrison is of very limited
relevance. For this reason, this Article will not discuss Morrison any further.
85 See generally 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
86 Id. at 647.
87 See id. at 639.
88 The Court held that mere negligent infringement did not constitute, for due proc-
ess purposes, a "deprivation" of the "property" that is a patent. See id. at 645.
89 See id. at 640-43.
90 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-46; see also id. at 647 (-Fhe examples of States avoiding
sovereign immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough [in the historical
record], but any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State deprived
patentees of property and left them without a remedy under state law is scarcer still.").
91 See id. at 646-47.
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limits and thus was proportional to the violations it attempted to rem-
edy.92
2. Kimel
Kimel, decided in 2000, was the first case after City of Boerne in
which the Court faced a statute that implicated the Court's three-
tiered, class-based analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.93 In
Kimnel, a state challenged the Section 5 authority for the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA).94 Again applying the "congru-
ence and proportionality" requirements to strike down the law, the
Court began by noting that age classifications challenged as violations
of equal protection receive only rational basis review.95 Indeed, the
Court noted that it had never concluded that a state's age discrimina-
tion violated the Equal Protection Clause.96 Given its reluctance to
strike down such discrimination, the Court concluded that applica-
tion of the ADEA to the states violated the proportionality require-
ment.
97
But the fact that age discrimination receives only rational basis
review by the Court, with the Court having rejected every such age
discrimination claim it heard, did not mean the end of the case. In-
stead, the Court at least considered the plaintiffs' argument that limi-
tations on ADEA liability meant that the statute prohibited only age
discrimination that was so unreasonable as to be unconstitutionally
irrational or at least so unreasonable such that the statute could be
considered proportional to the underlying constitutional violation.
98
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the ADEA's excep-
tions and limitations were sufficiently narrow such that the statute did
in fact prohibit a broad swath of conduct that would survive rational
basis scrutiny in a constitutional challenge.99 The Court's rejection of
the plaintiff's argument, however, is less important than the fact that
they considered it serious enough to warrant several pages of statu-
tory analysis. Such consideration suggests that the Court seems to
have recognized that conduct could still theoretically be unconstitu-
9 2 See id. at 647 (citing City of Boerne's discussion of City of Rome).
9 3 Seegenerally 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); 528 U.S. 62, 66, 67 (2000).
95 See Kimel 528 U.S. at 82-86.
96 See id. at 83.
97 See id. at 86.
9 8 See id.
9 See id. at 86-89.
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tional and thus appropriately proscribable by Congress acting pursu-
ant to Section 5, even if it was judged only under the rational basis
standard. 100
Finally, the Court considered the possibility that the ADEA's ap-
plicability to the states might have been justified as a response to a
"difficult" or "intractable" problem.101 The Court seems here to be
indicating that unconstitutional age discrimination might be a serious
problem, difficult to prove, or otherwise impervious to correction,
thus requiring an aggressive legislative response. In considering that
possibility, the Court examined the legislative record to determine
whether there was in fact a significant problem with states engaging in
unconstitutional age discrimination. 10 2 Reviewing the legislative rec-
ord for examples of such discrimination engaged in by states, the
Court concluded that the record did not reveal such a problem, dis-
missing the plaintiffs' evidence of congressional concern about age
discrimination by state government as "isolated sentences clipped
fiom floor debates and legislative reports. "103
Thus, in Kinel, the Court presented the situation as one combin-
ing a deferential judicial review standard for age discrimination with a
broad-based legislative prohibition on such discrimination unaccom-
panied by evidence that Congress perceived a significant problem
with state government age discrimination. This picture strongly sug-
gested that the Court would be skeptical of any Section 5 legislation
addressing discrimination against groups that do not receive height-
ened judicial protection, at least in the absence of significant legisla-
tive evidence that a constitutional problem does in fact exist. Before
that suggestion could solidify, howeve, the Court had to confront one
additional fact pattern.
100 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-89
101 Id. at 88; see also Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) ("Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not de-
terminative ... identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of
our Section 5 calculus because 'strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be
an unwarranted response to anothe, lesser one.'") (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 527, 530 (1997)).
102 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
103 1(.; see also id. at 90 (describing the record as being "assorted sentences ... cob-
ble[d] together").
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D. Garrett and the Problem ofCleburne
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett completes the
set of general situations the Court could face when confronting a Sec-
tion 5 statute.1°4 In Garrett, the Court, by the same 5-4 majority that
decided Kimel and Florida Prepaid, struck down the application of Title
I of the ADA to the states, to the extent that statute authorized private
party lawsuits seeking damages against states that had not consented
to federal jurisdiction. 0 5 Applying the congruence and proportional-
ity test, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that state discrimina-
tion against the disabled was subject only to the rational basis stan-
dard, which allowed the disabled to be treated differently if there
were any rational reason for doing so.1 06 So far, this was no different
from the analysis in Kimel, which noted that the same deferential re-
view applied to age classifications. 107 But in Garrett, the Court con-
fronted a challenge beyond that faced in Kimel. Unlike age
classifications, the Court had at least once struck down an instance of
disability discrimination as failing the rational basis standard.108 Thus,
while the lack of suspect class status (and the attendant heightened
review) may have made it very difficult for Congress to justify legisla-
tion benefiting that group, the Court in Garrett had to confront the
fact that on at least one occasion, it had found discrimination against
the group to be so unreasonable as to fail the rational basis test. The
question then arose: Given that the Court itself had found such un-
constitutional discrimination against the group, would not application
of the ADA to the states "enforce" against such discrimination?
The majority's response to this proposition, however, was not en-
couraging. While it noted and reaffirmed City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center's conclusion that negative attitudes or fears alone could
not justify government action, the Court in Garrett described its hold-
ing in Cleburne as resting on standard rational basis review, as opposed
to the less deferential type of review commentators (and other mem-
104 As noted above, this statement is something of an oversimplification but still essen-
tially accurate. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
105 See Bd. of Tr. of the Unviv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967, 968 (2001). Pre-
sumably, the Court would also prohibit such a lawsuit against an unconsenting state in
state court, given the result in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that general
principles of state sovereign immunity prevent Congress from authorizing private party
lawsuits for retrospective relief against unconsenting states in state court when the federal
law is based on an Article I power).106 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64.
107 See 528 U.S. at 83.
108 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449, 450 (1985).
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bers of the Court) had seen in Cleburne.10 9 By reading Cleburne as the
exceptional situation where standard rational basis review required
that a statute be struck down, the Court laid the foundation for con-
cluding that there was no pattern and practice of such unusually irra-
tional discrimination. In turn, that conclusion led it to hold that the
ADA was not congruent and proportional to such violations that did
exist and thus was invalid as Section 5 legislation.
Again, as in Kimel, the Court considered the evidence Congress
had marshaled regarding the constitutional problem posed by disabil-
ity discrimination.11 0 In examining the legislative record, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist started by severely limiting the scope of the data it was will-
ing to considel 1 1 In particular, the Court insisted on excluding not
just examples of private discrimination but also discrimination per-
formed by units of local governments, on the theory that such units
did not enjoy the protection of the Eleventh Amendment and thus
could be sued for retrospective relief without Congress having to use
its Section 5 authority.112
Turning to actual examples of state government discrimination
against the disabled, the Court noted that the record included exam-
ples of "half a dozen" instances of state government discrimination.
1 1 3
It found these instances to be insufficient, observing that it was not
clear whether those acts of discrimination were unconstitutionally ir-
rational.1 1 4 The Court noted that Congress had failed to make a for-
mal legislative finding that states were acting unconstitutionally and
similarly failed to state such a conclusion in the committee reports on
the ADA.115 It also noted that accounts of state discrimination against
the disabled cited in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion were submit-
ted not directly to Congress, but to the Task Force on the Rights and
109 Compare Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 n.4 (describing Cleburne as based on "the basic
principles of rationality review"), with, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational
Basis Review, and the Inpact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L. REv. 591, 607-16
(1999-2000) (discussing the Court's approach in Cleburne and concluding that the major-
ity applied a test more stringent than the normal rational basis review), and Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 459 (Marshall,J., concurring in the result and dissenting in part).
110 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66.
HI See id. at 965.
112 Id.
113 Id. The Court cited, among others, a state university's refusal to hire a person be-
cause of his blindness and a state agency's firing of an employee because of his epilepsy. See
id. at 965.
114 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965.
15 See id. at 965-66.
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Empowerment of Americans With Disabilities, which had also failed
to make findings about unconstitutional conduct by the states.11 6
Moving on to the actual content of the ADA, the Court con-
cluded that the statute's provisions went beyond what was required
under the rational basis standard, rendering the ADA a dispropor-
tionate response to whatever constitutional problem may exist.117 It
noted that the ADA required employers to make "reasonable accom-
modations" for disabled individuals otherwise able to perform their
jobs" 8 and concluded that failure to provide those accommodations
might be perfectly rational, though cruel-in the Court's words,
"hardheaded" though perhaps "hardhearted."11 9 The Court found
similar problems with other provisions of the ADA, including its plac-
ing of the burden on the employer to show that a requested accom-
modation would constitute an undue burden (and thus not required
under the statute) 120 and its prohibition of standards that had a dispa-
rate impact on the disabled.121 According to the majority, these provi-
sions, like the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, went be-
yond what the Constitution required, all in the context of an area
where the Court was unconvinced that Congress had demonstrated
the existence of a constitutional problem.
The Court concluded by comparing the ADA, once again,122 with
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act upheld in South Carolina.123
The Court described those provisions as a "detailed but limited reme-
dial scheme" applicable "in those areas of the Nation where abundant
evidence of States' systematic denial of [constitutional voting] rights
was identified." 124 It pointed to the careful examination of the issue
that Congress undertook before enacting the Voting Rights Act and to
116 See id. at 966.
117 See id.
1 8 See id. at 966-67 (citing the ADA).
119 See Ganett, 121 S. Ct. at 964; see also id. at 966-67 (stating that "it would be entirely
rational (and therefore constitutional)" for a state to refuse to make the "reasonable ac-
commodation [s]" required by the ADA).
120 See id. at 967.
121 See id. (comparing the ADA's disparate impact test with the constitutional test for
equal protection, which requires discriminatory intent, citing Wshington v. Davis, 446 U.S.
229, 239 (1976)).
122 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (citing City of Boerne's and Florida Prepaid's
comparison of the statutes those cases struck down with the statute upheld in South Caro-
lina).
2 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967.
124 Id.
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its documentation of "a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by
the States. 125
Concurring, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, lauded
the purposes of the ADA, but suggested that state violations of the
ADA might not have their base in "embod[iments of] the miscon-
ceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens.'1 26 He noted
that allegations of unconstitutional disability discrimination had not
been made to federal or state courts and agreed with the Court that
Congress had also failed to supply such a record.127
E. The Current Law of Section 5
After City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kinel, and Garrett, certain
propositions about Congress' Section 5 power seem clear. First, the
Court is shying away from the idea expressed in Morgan that Section 5
authorizes Congress to engage in its own interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and that congressional interpretation is owed
deference by the Court.128 Second, Morgan's general level of defer-
ence to Congress' Section 5 authority-expressed as McCulloch's
broad formulation of judicial deference to legislative judgments con-
cerning the need for and breadth of Article I-justified regulation-
may be less secure, in light of both the Court's careful review
regarding whether constitutional violations exist that justify Section 5
legislation and its requirement that such legislation be limited in
scope so as to correspond to the constitutional violation it seeks to
address. 12 9 The recent cases' consistent references to Soith Carolina
and their descriptions of the Voting Rights Act provisions upheld in
that case as carefully limited suggest as much. 130
The Court has also indicated that it will closely scrutinize statutes
benefiting groups that do not enjoy heightened judicial protection
under the Equal Protection Clause. This seems true even if, as in
125 Id.
126 Id. at 968 (KennedyJ., concurring).
127 Id. (KennedyJ., concurring).
128 SeeCity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-29 (1997).
129 Compare e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (scrutinizing the legis-
lative record to determine whether Congress had found a pattern of unconstitutional state
discrimination against the elderly), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56
(1966) (asking if Congress' likely conclusions were reasonable).
130 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001); City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 532-33; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (citing the City of Boerne discussion of the limited nature of
the Voting Rights Act's provisions).
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Garrett, the statute benefited a group that the Court had found in the
past to have been the victim of unconstitutionally irrational discrimi-
nation.131 Again, this close scrutiny will entail an examination of
whether the scope of the statute is limited in a way corresponding to
the constitutional violations found.132 On the other hand, the Court
has continued to endorse the "wider net" theory of cases like City of
Rome, allowing Congress to prohibit broader swaths of conduct than
would be forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment itself as long
as there is a sufficient factual record supporting the need for the
broader legislation. 33 The Court has also continued to insist that it
respects Congress' determinations about what is needed to guarantee
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 34
As a rough description, then, the current Court requires Con-
gress to do more by way of fact-finding before it will uphold statutes as
valid uses of the Section 5 power. The Court also requires Congress to
take more care to limit legislation so as to correspond more closely to
the constitutional violations it seeks to address. In essence, the careful
review the Court now gives to Section 5 legislation shifts the presump-
tion away from Congress, requiring it, rather than the state, to make
out a case for its use of that power.135 The next part of this Article ap-
plies these observations to ENDA in an attempt to determine whether
the Court would uphold its applicability to the states as appropriate
Section 5 legislation.
II. GARRETT, ROMER, AND ENDA
At first glance, it might appear that Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett sounds the death knell for any authorization
131 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64.
132 See, e.g., id. at 967 (comparing the Voting Rights Act provisions upheld in South
Carolina, described as "a detailed but limited remedial scheme" applicable in parts of the
country where Congress identified "abundant evidence of States' systematic denial" of
constitutional rights, with the ADA, which it described as a "comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities") (quoting
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1) (1994)).
13 See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
13 4 See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
1-3 Compare Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation AflerMorrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (describing
the Court's current review of Section 5 legislation as "strict scrutiny"). It is unclear whether
such a de facto shift in the burden of proof applies also to legislation targeting discrimina-
tion on the basis of criteria the Court always considers suspect, most notably race and gen-
der. The Court has not decided a case considering such a statute in the post-City of Boerne
period.
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in ENDA for state employees to sue their employers for retrospective
relief.136 In both Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Garrett, the Court
was quite skeptical of the Section 5 basis for federal legislation
benefiting groups that the Court had not previously favored with sus-
pect class status. Garrett further suggests that an occasional decision
striking down a statute harming a particular group, on the ground
that the statute failed the rational basis test, would not be of much
help in saving a Section 5-based statute benefiting that group. This
latter fact makes it even more doubtful that the Court would find
ENDA an appropriate enforcement of the constitutional rights found
to be violated in Roner v. Evans137 given that decision's well-known
ambiguity. 38
This part of the Article considers the constitutionality of ENDA as
Section 5 legislation. It starts by summarizing ENDA's most important
provisions. It then identifies and describes the constitutional violation
resulting when a state engages in employment discrimination against
gay men and lesbians. The Article then considers whether there is a
pattern of such violations and then asks whether ENDA is directly tar-
geted at those violations or, if not, whether it is a congruent and pro-
portional response to them.
A. ENDA
ENDA's basic provisions are straightforward. 13 9 ENDA would
niake it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge ally individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of
the individual, because of such individual's sexual orientation."140
This terminology tracks closely the anti-discrimination language in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment
13 Versions of ENDA introduced in the past have clearly intended to bring states
within their purview in their capacity as employers. For example, S. 1276, introduced in
the 106th Congress, explicitly abrogates state sovereign imnmnunit. Section 13(a) provides
for remiedies at law to the extent available under Title VII, S. 1276 § 13(b) and defines
"employer" to include "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce (as defined in
section 701(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(h)) who has 15 or more
employees"), S. 1276 § 3(3) (A).
137 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
138 See inia notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
139 S. 1284, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001). Unless noted other-
wise, citations in this section are to the House and Senate versions of the bill introduced
into the 107th Congress.
140 S. 1284; H.R. 2692.
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discrimination on the basis of race or gender.141 In an important con-
trast to Title VII, however, ENDA does not allow an employee to make
out a discrimination claim based on an employment practice that has
a disparate impact relative to sexual orientation.14 ENDA explicitly
waives state sovereign immunity143 and provides for retrospective re-
lief, although, importantly, it does not allow for back pay awards as a
component of compensatory damages.144 ENDA also includes a num-
ber of other important limitations. In addition to the prohibition on
back pay awards, ENDA limits relief by barring courts, as part of a re-
lief order, from ordering quotas or preferential treatment for gays. 145
141 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2001) (prohibiting same activity when per-
formed because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). A provi-
sion in ENDA preventing tie classification or segregation of employees so as to deprive
them of equal employment opportunities also closely tracks its counterpart provision in
Title VII. Compare S. 1284, § 4(a) (2), and H.RL 2692, § 4(a) (2), with 42 U.S.C. § 20 00 e-
2(a)(2).
142 Compare S. 1284, § 4(f), and H.R 2692, § 4(f) (both disallowing disparate impact
claims), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1971) (reading Title VII as
authorizing disparate impact claims).
143 See S. 1284, § 13(a); H.R 2692, § 13(a). ENDA also includes a provision deeming "a
State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program" to constitute a waiver
of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuit for the type of relief provided
in the statute. S. 1284, § 13(b) (1) (A); H.R 2692, § 13(b) (1) (A); see also sources cited infra
note 144. This provision, presumably designed as an insurance policy against the Supreme
Court holding ENDA to have exceeded Congress' Section 5 power, raises the question of
whether ENDA would be an appropriate expression of Congress' power to place condi-
tions on its grants of financial assistance to the states. That question is beyond the scope of
this Article, which focuses instead on the bill's grounding in Section 5. The framework for
this analysis is provided by South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). While South Dakota's
exceedingly lenient Spending Clause analysis was joined by seven Justices (Justice
O'Connor dissented, see id. at 212, and Justice Brennan did not reach the issue, see id.
(Brennan,J., dissenting)), it is at least possible that the Court's recent enthusiasm for judi-
cially crafted federalism rules could prompt the Court to re-examine that issue. Indeed, a
careful reading of South Dakota also suggests that the Court in that case did not definitively
decide the contours of the most important factor: the relatedness between the spending
condition and the federal interest in the program funded. See id. at 207-08 (stating this
factor); id. at 209 & n.3 (refraining from conclusively establishing the degree of related-
ness required); see also Coil. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999) (acknowledging that South Dakota also indicated that a federal
financial inducement to the states could be so coercive as to constitute unconstitutional
compulsion). If the Court does re-examine the scope of the Spending Clause, then
ENDA's Section 5 support would become dispositive. At any rate, there may well be par-
ticular state programs that in fact do not receive federal financial assistance, and for which
ENDA's Section 5 authorization would constitute the only support for abrogating state
sovereign immunity from claims for retrospective relief.
144 SeeS. 1284, 13(c) (2); H.1L 2692, § 13(c) (2).
145 SeeS. 1284, § 8(c); H.R. 2692, § 8(c). ENDA also prohibits employers from adopting
or instituting quotas based on sexual orientation. SeeS. 1284, § 8(a); H.R. 2692, § 8(a).
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It "does not apply to the provision of employee benefits to an individ-
ual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual." 146
ENDA does not apply to religious organizations, 147 the military,148 or
employers employing fewer than fifteen persons.149 It also allows em-
ployers to enforce rules regarding "nonprivate sexual conduct" if such
rules apply equally regardless of sexual orientation. 150 Enforcement is
analogous to enforcement under Title VII.151
B. Determining the Fourteenth Amendment Violation
In order to determine whether ENDA is "appropriate" Section 5
legislation, the first step is to determine the scope of the constitu-
tional violation inhering in state government employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. As the Court in Garrett noted,
under Section 5 "Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition
of [the Supreme] Court's constitutional jurisprudence, "152 but instead
has the power "both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guar-
anteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden
by the Amendment's text."153 The Garrett Court continued by noting
that "legislation reaching beyond the scope of Section l's actual guar-
antees must exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. "154
This statement of the law suggests that different inquiries may be
appropriate for legislation that simply repeats the constitutional limits
on state action the Court has found inhere in the Fourteenth
Amendment and for legislation that prohibits conduct beyond those
limits in order to remedy or deter unconstitutional conduct. The first
146 S. 1284, § 6; H.R. 2692, § 6.
147 See S. 1284, § 9; H.R. 2692, § 9 ("This Act shall not apply to a religious organiza-
tion."). Religious organizations are defined to include educational institutions either
owned or controlled by religious associations or societies or whose curriculum is directed
toward religious propagation. See S. 1284, § 3 (8); H.R. 2692, § 3 (8). By contrast, Title VII
exempts religious organizations (defined similarly as in ENDA) only from its prohibition
on religious discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
148 SeeS. 1284, § 10; H.R. 2692, § 10.
149 See S. 1284, § 3(4) (A); H.R. 2692, § 3(4) (A).
150 SeeS. 1284, § 11(a); H.R. 2692, § 11(a).
1" SeeS. 1284, § 12(a) (1) (A); H.R. 2692, § 12(a) (1) (A).
152 121 S. Ct. at 963.
153 Id. (citing Kimel . Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)).
154 121 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536).
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of these conceptions of the Section 5 power is hardly exceptional. If
the Section 5 power means anything, it must mean that Congress has
the power to prohibit conduct in general that the Court has found, in
a particular case, to violate the Constitution, as well as the power to
create remedies for such unconstitutional conduct. The narrowest
conception of the Section 5 power must include the power to prohibit
as a general rule what the Supreme Court has declared to be uncon-
stitutional in the context of a particular case. Indeed, given the
Court's statement in Cooper v. Aaron that a principle of constitutional
law enunciated by the Supreme Court is itself the "supreme Law of
the Land," such a power is close to superfluous.155 The congressional
power to create remedies for such unconstitutional conduct is only
slightly broader. This power too must be uncontroversial, as a matter
of textual interpretation, if Section 5's explicit grant of power to "en-
force" the Fourteenth Amendment is to have any meaning.
Thus, logically the task is simply to determine what sorts of sexual
orientation discrimination the Court has already found to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and compare that invidious discrimination
to the conduct outlawed in ENDA. Because disability discrimination
has a constitutional status quite analogous to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, Garrett provides a useful guide for how the
Court may approach that inquiry.
As with sexual orientation discrimination, the Court has on one
occasion, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center struck down a gov-
ernment action discriminating against the disabled on the ground
that it failed the rational basis test.156 The Garrett Court characterized
Cleburne as a case where the Court simply applied standard rational
basis review and struck the action down as reflecting "mere negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in
a zoning proceeding."157 The Court then noted that in the ADA Con-
M 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). Compare, e.g., id., with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
648-49 (1966) ("A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the
enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condi-
tion of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional re-
sourcefuilness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would
confine the legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only
those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of
merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the majestic generalities
of § 1 of the Amendment.") (citation omitted).
15 See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
157 121 S. Ct. at 964 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448). The action challenged in
Cleburne was a city ordinance requiring a special permit for a group home for the mentally
disabled but which did not require such a permit for other types of group homes.
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gress had failed to provide sufficient evidence that states were engag-
ing in a pattern of discrimination motivated by such negative atti-
tudes, divorced from proper government ends. 58
Applying this first step of the analysis to the situation posed by
sexual orientation discrimination, the challenge will be to character-
ize the constitutional violation in Rome); the one case in which the
Court has found anti-gay discrimination to be unconstitutional. 159
C. What is the Equal Protection Violation in Romer?
Commentators have described Justice Kennedy's opinion in Ro-
mer in a variety of ways: a reflection of an "anti-caste" principle inher-
ent in the Equal Protection Clause, 160 a gloss on the Bill of Attainder
Clause, 161 an example of heightened scrutiny under the more strin-
gent version of the rational basis test,162 and the first step toward
granting homosexuality suspect class status. 163 Assuming that a future
Court dealing with a challenge to ENDA would not read into Romer
the broader, more speculative content suggested by the "anti-caste"
theory or the quasi-Bill of Attainder analysis, 164 and assuming further
158 Id. at 964-66.
159 See generally 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
160 See generally Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMt-
MENT. 257 (1996).
161 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996).
162 See generally, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some
Questions About ProfessorAmars Analysis ofRome, 95 MICH. L. REV. 236 (1996).
163 See generally, e.g., Jerald W. Rogers, Note, Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny Has
Fonnd a Rational Basis-Is The Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect Status for Gays, Lesbians,
and Bisexuals?, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 953 (1997).
164 This is not to suggest that such readings are "incorrect," in the sense that they are
logically unsupportable, historically inaccurate, or fail to lead to a coherent understanding
of the Constitution. It is to suggest, however, that such readings are not the ones most
likely to be adopted by the Court if and when it needs to characterize Romer when dealing
with a future challenge to ENDA. If Garrett is any indication, the Court will simply read
Romer very narrowly (as Garrett Court read Cleburne). On the other hand, it should be
noted that there is at least some difference in the tones of Cleburne and Romer "hile
Clebu rne purported to be a simple application of the rational basis test (though with the
unusual result that the statute failed the test), the Romer opinion continually notes the
uniqueness of Amendment 2 and the harm it does to the equal protection principle. See
Romet 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) ("Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal
status effected by [Amendment 21."); id. ("The change that Amendment 2 works in the
legal status of gays and lesbians in the private sphere is far reaching."); id. at 629 ("Not
confined to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid all laws or
policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every
level of Colorado government."); id. at 632 ("Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even th[e]
conventional inquiry [required by equal protection, into the relationship between stati-
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that it would not use Romer as the jumping off point for declaring sex-
ual orientation a suspect classification, 65 the Court would be left with
the need simply to take Romer at its word, for what it actually said,
rather than for what it implied or for what it should logically lead
to.1 66 Thus, a close reading of Romer seems appropriate.
Romer considered a challenge to Amendment 2, an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution enacted by the people of Colorado in a
referendum election in 1992.167 Amendment 2 stated, in relevant part:
[N]either the State ... nor any of its ... subdivisions ...
shall enact ... or enforce any statute ... or policy whereby
homosexual... orientation [or] conduct.., shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of... any protected ... status or
claim of discrimination .... 1 68
The majority's analysis of this provision was surprisingly terse, taking
up little over four pages in the U.S. Reports. 169 The Court cited two
tory ends and means]. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and ...
invalid form of legislation."); id. at 633 ("Amendment 2 confounds th[e] normal process
of judicial review [under the Equal Protection Clause]."); id. ("The resulting dis-
qualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence."); id. ("It is not within our constitutional tradition to
enact laws of this sort."). The point, then, is that it is always possible that the Court, in
construing Romer in the future, may well point to the uniqueness of Amendment 2 as re-
quiring a unique response, for example, the enunciation of an "anti-caste" principle. See id.
at 635 ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else .... A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.").
165 The classic example of such a progression is in gender, where the Court's first deci-
sion striking down a gender classification, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 77 (1971), was
based on the rational basis standard. Within two years, four members of the Court had
argued that gender should be a suspect classification, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973), and within five years a majority had accepted intermediate or quasi-
suspect status for gender, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976). The Court, how-
ever, has not recognized a new suspect or quasi-suspect class since the 1970s, preferring
instead to strike laws down under the rational basis test. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (refusing to accord suspect class status
to the mentally retarded, but striking down a law that burdened that group on the ground
that it failed the rational basis test). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553
(1996) (using the intermediate scrutiny test to strike down a gender classification, but
arguably redefining that test to require more stringent scrutiny).
166 Compare cases cited supra at note 165 and accompanying text (tracing the progres-
sion of the Court's treatment of gender classifications).
167 Details about the referendum, and the course of the Romer litigation, can be found
in Rogers, supra note 163, at 954-56.16 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, repealed ly Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
169 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-35.
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reasons for striking down Amendment 2. First, it concluded that
Amendment 2 "confounds" normal rational basis review.170 According
to the Court, Amendment 2 was different from laws upheld under the
rational basis standard because those laws were "narrow enough in
scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain
[that there existed] some relation between the classification and the
purpose it served," thus ensuring "that classifications are not drawn
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."1 71
By contrast, Amendment 2's extreme combination of a group,
identified by a single trait, which is then denied protection across the
board via a broad-ranging disability,172 results in the "disqualification
of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from
the law,"1 73 making it "in general more difficult for one group of citi-
zens than for all others to seek aid from the government."'174 Accord-
ing to the Court, this sort of broad-based denial of government assis-
tance, based on a single trait, constituted a violation of equal
protection in its most literal sense.175
The Court's second reason for striking down Amendment 2 was
much more prosaic and, perhaps for that reason, easier to express.
The Court concluded that the broad-based nature of the disabilities
Amendment 2 imposed on gays and lesbians exceeded any legitimate
purpose the government might have had, thus leaving animus as the
only explanation for its enactment. 176 The Court noted that Colorado
defended Amendment 2 as a means of respecting the associational
rights of landlords and employers that might object to homosexuality
and as a way the state could conserve its resources to fight discrimina-
tion against other groups.177 The Court found these justifications
"impossible to credit" given how much further Amendment 2's bur-
dens ran. 178 The Court concluded that Amendment 2 violated a "con-
ventional and venerable" principle of equal protection: Namely, that a
170 See id. at 633.
171 Id. at 632-33.
172 See id. at 632.
173 Id. at 633; see also id. at 626-31 (characterizing the effect of Amendment 2 as an ex-
clusion of homosexuals from the right to equal treatment by the government in a broad
variety of contexts).
174 Rome; 517 U.S. at 633.
175 Id. ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citi-
zens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws in the most literal sense.").
176 See id. at 632.
177 See id.
178 See i.
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law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government in-
terest.1 79
Leaving aside the more speculative theories about Rome, 180 for
our purposes the unifying theme in the Court's rationale is the lack of
legitimate justification-and thus the irrationality-of the
classification given the scope of the burdens Amendment 2 placed on
gays and lesbians. 81 The Court's second justification, that Amend-
ment 2 simply failed standard rational basis review, clearly reflects this
concern, as the imbalance between Amendment 2's ends and means
raised the suspicion that the provision was motivated by another, ille-
gitimate, motivation. The Court's first justification also reflects the
concern about legitimate justification, as the Court was simply suspi-
cious that any enactment so broad could serve a legitimate govern-
ment interest.
Thus, in determining whether ENDA simply targets or provides a
remedy for discrimination of the sort condemned in Rome, it might
be helpful to begin by considering the rationality (in the constitu-
tional sense) of sexual orientation discrimination in state government
employment.
D. Is ENDA Targeted at Unconstitutionally Irrational Sexual
Orientation Discrimination?
The strongest argument distinguishing the ADA from ENDA may
be that employment discrimination against gays and lesbians is simply
irrational in a way that various types of discrimination against the dis-
abled are not. In both Cleburne and Rome, the Court struck down state
action as violating the Equal Protection Clause, even though dis-
crimination against the burdened group-respectively, the mentally
disabled and homosexuals-ostensibly received only rational basis
scrutiny.182 In both cases, the Court concluded that the government
action was motivated by animus or fear-that is, by reasons that are
illegitimate for purposes of the rational basis test, which requires a
179 See Rome, 517 U.S. at 632.
180 See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
181 Obviously, this is an extreme over simplification. As will be clear shortly, a major
difference between the violation reflected in Amendment 2 and the discrimination out-
lawed by ENDA is that the former is much broader, stretching across, as the Court de-
scribed, "an almost limitless number of transaction and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society." Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
182 See id. at 632; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443, 444
(1985).
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rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.18 3 In Garrett,
the Court concluded that a state's refusal to provide the accommoda-
tions required by the ADA might not be motivated by such an ille-
gitimate purpose, but instead by a rational (in the Court's words,
"hardheaded")184 desire to save money, as cruel ("hardhearted") 185 as
that decision may be. Although left unsaid, the Court's analysis clearly
implies that such a refusal to take the steps required by the ADA
might be irrational in a broader sense-given either the value dis-
abled workers could produce if provided an accommodation or, even
more generally, the net social benefit of making it possible for dis-
abled individuals to work and participate in society.186 However, the
standard rational basis test leaves to the state the balancing of these
costs and benefits.
Would the same analysis apply to employment discrimination
against gays? In other words, is there a "hardheaded" cost-benefit bal-
ancing that would go into a state decision to engage in employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? There does not
seem to be, for the obvious reason that a rule of non-discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation would not necessarily require states
to spend funds to modify most workplaces to take account of or ac-
commodate differing sexual orientations. 18 7 The one possible way in
which employing gays and lesbians may in fact require extra costs
among states would be if other workers' resistance or hostility to the
presence of a gay co-worker required the state to shift personnel or
otherwise alter the workplace, thereby increasing the state's costs.188
Is it otherwise rational to engage in workplace discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation? This is, of course, an important ques-
tion to ask for the Section 5 analysis. Indeed, it would be dispositive if
the answer is "no." The Court in Garrett stated that "Section 5 legisla-
tion reaching beyond the scope of Section l's actual guarantees must
exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
183 See Romei, 517 U.S. at 632; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-47.
184 121 S. Ct. at 964.
185 1d.
186 Indeed, Congress made a finding to this effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (1994)
("[Tlhe continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination [against people
with disabilities] ... costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductiity.").
187 Although the military is a possible exception, ENDA is inapplicable to the military.
See iPfra note 229 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
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prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."' 189 Thus,
congruence and proportionality seem to be unnecessary if the legisla-
tion directly aims at actual Fourteenth Amendment violations.190 This
Article now considers whether sexual orientation discrimination of
the type prohibited in ENDA can ever be rational.
1. Status and Conduct, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and Bowers v. Hardwick
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively few courts have considered the
constitutionality of government employment discrimination against
gays and lesbians, at least outside of the realm of discharges from mili-
tary service. Some employment dismissals are defended on the theory
that the plaintiff's expression of her sexual orientation, or her acting
in a way consistent with it (say, by participating in a same-sex marriage
ceremony), constituted disruptive conduct that justified the dismissal
completely apart from the plaintiff's sexual orientation.'9 ' Relatedly,
in cases dealing with law enforcement jobs or those involving security
clearances, courts have held that government has the power to ex-
clude on the basis of whether the individual has violated the law or
lied when asked about his sexual orientation.192 Strictly speaking,
these cases are not relevant to the question of whether sexual orienta-
tion itself-as a status, divorced from conduct-is a constitutionally
permissible ground for firing or not hiring someone. They do, how-
ever, thereby raise a subsidiary question: To what extent is sexual ori-
entation relevant in that homosexual or bisexual orientation allows
the government rationally to presume homosexual conduct? 193 A state
19 121 S. Ct. at 963 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997)).
190 This, of course, is not surprising; such legislation would be doing nothing more
than prohibiting legislatively the sort of conduct that the Court has already held to be a
violation of the Constitution. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
191 See generally, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 E3d 1097 (l1th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (up-
holding dismissal of lesbian from attorney general's office because of certain conduct,
including her participation in a same-sex marriage ceremony, which the Attorney General
thought might affect the efficiency of the office's performance). These cases raise compli-
cated issues of free speech and association law. For an examination of these issues in the
employment context, see generally Marvin Hill & Emily Delacenseri, Procrustean Beds and
Draconian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations, and Officious Intermeddlers - Bosses, Workers, Courts and
LaborArbitrators, 57 Mo. L. REv. 51 (1992); see also id. at 140, 141 (summarizing caselaw and
suggesting appropriate rules).
192 See generally, e.g., Doe v. Gates, 981 E2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (involving an em-
ployee who lied to the CIA about his sexual orientation); Padula v. Webster, 822 F2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing problem that would arise with a law enforcement officer poten-
tially engaging in illegal conduct).
193 Very often courts have simply presumed that a person's homosexual orientation in-
dicates a likelillood that she will engage in homosexual sex. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
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whose law criminalizes sodomy might well argue that it is rational for
it to engage in employment discrimination against homosexuals be-
cause they have a propensity for violating the law, even though such a
classification might be seriously under or over inclusive. 194
The main battleground on which this status versus conduct ar-
gument has been played out has been the military under the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy.195 Under that policy, the military can dis-
charge anyone who engages in homosexual acts or who states that
they are gay or lesbian unless they can prove that they do not have a
propensity to engage in homosexual acts. 196 Thus, while seemingly
only proscribing conduct (engaging in homosexual acts or having a
propensity to do so), the policy, according to some commentators,
effectively proscribes status since it is relatively easy for the military to
argue that the status of being homosexual indicates a propensity to
engage in homosexual acts. 197 This logic has led courts to uphold the
policy.1 98
If the Court were to follow such a path with regard to ENDA, it
might well strike the statute down as going beyond unconstitutional
sexual orientation discrimination on the ground that a state would
have a rational reason to discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion to the extent that sexual orientation indicated a propensity to
violate the law, that is, to commit a sex crime. 199 While a propensity to
881 E2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989). The presumption that homosexual orientation infers
homosexual conduct is, of course, the underlying principle of de military's current "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy. See Diane H. Mazur, IWord Games, War Games, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 1590,
1598-1600 (2000) (reviewing JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILI-
TARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999)).
194 See, e.g., Michele L. Booth, Shahar v. Bowers: Is Public Opinion Transformed into a Le-
gitimate Government Interest I17ien Government Acts as Employer?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1235, 1260
(1998) (citing evidence that common sexual activities between lesbians are often not pro-
hibited by sodomy laws); id. at 1262 (citing evidence that most heterosexuals have engaged
in illegal sexual activities).
195 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
16 SeeMazur, supra note 193, at 1595.
197 See, e.g., id. at 1598-1600.
198 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 88 E3d 1280, 1298 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson x
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Hoffman v. United States, 1997 WL
136418, *3 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 688-93 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (upholding, under pre-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, a dismissal of a midshipman at
the Naval Academy because of his statement that he was a homosexual on the ground that
his statement of homosexual orientation provided a rational basis for the military to pre-
suine that he was likely to engage in homosexual conduct). See generally, e.g., Thorne .
Dep't. of Def., 945 F. Stipp. 924 (E.D. Va. 1996).
199 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law crimi-
nalizing sodomy). However, in that case the Supreme Court dealt only with the argument
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violate the law might be more relevant to some state jobs than oth-
ers-for example, more relevant to a state trooper position than to a
clerical one-a state's desire to have law-abiding employees presuma-
bly would be considered legitimate. Nevertheless, it should not be
taken for granted that a sexual orientation job criterion would be
sufficiently linked to that goal as to survive rational basis scrutiny.200
To the extent that state sex crime laws simply prohibit certain types of
sex, regardless of the gender of those engaged in it, there is evidence
that heterosexuals engage in such illegal sexual conduct at least as
frequently as homosexuals.201
Given cases upholding classifications with only the most tenuous
relation to legitimate interests, 20 2 the Court would have to apply a
more stringent type of rational basis review in order to strike down
such a statute on this theory. On the other hand, to the extent that a
state's sex crimes law prohibits such conduct only when engaged in
between two persons of the same sex, such a prohibition may itself be
constitutionally problematic as a matter of equal protection.203 With-
out a rational reason for singling out gays and lesbians, Romer provides
at least some hope that the current Court would strike such legisla-
tion down, or at least not credit it as providing a state with a legitimate
justification for discriminating against gays and lesbians in employ-
ment.
Thus, a state may not have a good argument that it should be
able to engage in sexual orientation-based employment discrimina-
tion because sexual orientation is a marker for a propensity to engage
in illegal conduct that the state can constitutionally seek to prevent in
its workforce. Nevertheless, Hardwick remains a hurdle, requiring the
Court not only to disentangle the concepts of status and conduct, but
to decouple the two by refusing to credit the argument that sexual
based in substantive due process, namely, as framed by the majority, the argument that the
right to privacy found in the due process clause included the right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy. See id. at 190, 191. It explicitly refrained from considering the equal protection
issue. See id. at 196 n.8.
200 This issue would not arise at all in a state that did not have a sodomy law.
201 See sources cited infra note 287.
202 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (upholding California's Proposi-
tion 13 property tax statute based, in part, on the relationship between differential tax
treatment of newly acquired and long-held property on a possible state interest in neigh-
borhood stability); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (uphold-
ing differential treatment of truck signage advertising the truck owner's own products and
signage rented out to third parties based on the possible safety differences traffic experts
may have discerned between them).203 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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orientation is a legally sufficient marker for same-sex conduct. 2°4 It is,
however, exactly that sort of careful analysis that would require the
Court to engage in a more searching review than suggested by the
standard rational basis test.20 5 To the extent that such unusually
searching "rational basis" review is necessary, it might militate against
the Court's willingness to hold that sexual orientation employment
discrimination is irrational.
2. Pure Status Arguments
On the other hand, some courts have focused their analysis
squarely on the question whether sexual orientation discrimination in
employment is constitutional. For example, in Weaver v. Nebo School
District,20 6 a federal district court granted summary judgment to a les-
bian high school teacher/athletic coach who was removed as a coach
after she disclosed her orientation in response to a student's question
and thus according to school officials, caused controversy. The court
explicitly rejected as insufficient grounds for the school's action the
community's supposed negative response to her disclosure, "[i]f the
community's perception is based on nothing more than unsupported
assumptions, outdated stereotypes, and animosity."20 7 According to
the court, the only appropriate justification for removing the plaintiff
would have been one related to her job performance. 208
If community dislike is an inappropriate ground for employment
discrimination, presumably it would be insufficient for a state to jus-
tify employment discrimination on the ground that co-workers would
resist or be hostile to a gay or lesbian colleague. In both situations, the
employer would have to incur costs in order to ensure a smoothly
204 For a discussion of the relationship between status and conduct in the context of
sexual orientation, see, for example, Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kultnrkampf orHow
Ame.ica Overruled Bowers v Hardwick Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn', 49 DuKE L.J.
1559, 1576-80 (2000); Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on
Janet Halley's Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1781, 1790-94 (1993).
205 Other commentators have noted the difficulty Hardwick presents for gay rights ad-
vocates, even when they litigate issues unrelated to due process. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap,
GaV Men and Lesbians Down By Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing Toll ofBowers v. Hard-
wick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 17-24 (1994); see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1587 (1993) (noting that his-
torically, sodomy's criminalization assisted in the oppression of gays and lesbians in areas
such as government employment).
26 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998).
207 Id. at 1289.
208 d.
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functioning workplace: In Weaver, the school would have to spend
time, and perhaps money, in responding to parental complaints, edu-
cating both parents and students, and generally calming the situation
and ensuring physical safety. This is exactly what the state as employer
would have to do if the complaining or resisting parties were co-
workers.2 9 If such costs, or the general tension caused by the mixture
of gay and homophobic individuals, are not considered rational rea-
sons to allow the state to discriminate in Weave, they should not be
considered any different when the complaining or resisting parties
are co-workers. Thus, assuming that there is no other "hardheaded"
reason for discriminating against a lesbian or gay person, and further
assuming that the removal was not for reasons of conduct as opposed
to mere orientation, 210 there would appear to be no room for moral-
ity-based community disapproval to justify discrimination.211
It should be noted that this argument does not deny the more
general role of morality in law. Indeed, as a doctrinal matter, the Su-
preme Court in Hardwick made it clear that morality is a constitution-
ally appropriate justification for prohibitions on at least some con-
duct. 212 But, decisions such as Weaver suggest that morality cannot
209 See generally id. at 1279.
210 Compare, e.g., Shaharv. Bowers, 114 E3d 1097, 1106-08 (lth Cir. 1997) (upholding
dismissal of lesbian from attorney general's office because of certain conduct, including
her participation in a same-sex marriage ceremony, that the Attorney General thought
might affect the office's performance), with Padula v. Webster, 822 F 2d 97, 102, 104 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the FBI could rationally refuse to hire a lesbian candidate be-
cause her sexual orientation suggested a propensity to engage in conduct that might be
illegal in areas in which she would be operating as a law enforcement officer). But see
sources cited infra note 287 (citing studies suggesting the under- and over-inclusiveness of
Padula's rationale).
211 See Weaver, 29 F Supp. 2d at 1289. For other examples of similar reasoning outside
the potentially special context of the military, see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 E3d 446, 458
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that school officials had no rational basis for failing to protect a
high school student from harassment based on his sexual orientation) ;Jantz v. Muci, 759 F
Supp. 1543, 1548-52 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding both that sexual orientation is an inherently
suspect classification and that employment discrimination against homosexuals is irra-
tional in contexts where there is no issue of security clearances or special risk if the em-
ployee engages in illegal action), rev'd on other grounds, 976 E2d 623, 627-30 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding that rule against sexual orientation discrimination in government em-
ployment was not well settled when the offending conduct occurred and that defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity); see also Woodard v. Gallagher, 1992 WL 252279, *3
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1992) (concluding that sexual orientation should receive heightened rational
basis scrutiny but deciding case on other grounds).
212 See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see also Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 572, 575
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that a ban on public nudity
was constitutionally valid because of government's power to enforce good morals). But see
id. at 570 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (SouterJ., concurring); id. at 590, 591 (WhiteJ.,
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serve as a rational basis justifying different treatment of groups based
on status such as sexual orientation. Indeed, combining Hardwick and
Romer seems to require that conclusion. In Hardwick the Court explic-
itly stated that morality may be a valid government interest for ban-
ning certain conduct,213 while Romer held Amendment 2 unconstitu-
tional in part because it concluded that it was based on animus toward
homosexuals.2 14 But even if harmonizing Hardwick and Romer does not
require this conclusion, it nevertheless surely seems a reasonable
reading of the Equal Protection Clause, especially in light of other
cases prohibiting the criminalization of statuses some of whose char-
acteristic conduct can be proscribed. 215 And if such a conclusion
seems reasonable, then there is all the more reason to view ENDA as a
confirmation of the equal protection guarantee, rather than a rewrit-
ing of it.216
3. The Significance of ENDA's Limits
a. ReadingRomer as Unique
The problem with the foregoing analysis is that the Court may
simply cut it off by pointing to the uniqueness of the burdens
Amendment 2 placed on gays and lesbians. Certainly there are
sufficient references in Romer to Amendment 2's novelty to allow the
Court to distinguish it from more targeted discrimination prohibited
in ENDA.217 Amendment 2's uniqueness affected the Romer Court's
analysis in two very different ways. The Court's first rationale for strik-
ing down Amendment 2 did in fact focus on the law's uniqueness, as
dissenting) (resting their analyses on the degree to which nude dancing enjoyed First
Amendment protection and on the weight of the non-morality based justifications offered
for the statute).
213 See 478 U.S. at 196.
214 See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S.
Ct. 955, 964 (2001) (reading Cleburne as concluding that the government action was based
on prejudice and thus was unconstitutional); City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985) (concluding that the government action was based on prejudice
and thus was unconstitutional).
215 Compare, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 668 (1962) (striking down a
law criminalizing the status of being a drug addict).
216 Compare generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA
on the grounds that it essentially overturned the Court's decision in Smith); see also infra
notes 327-340 and accompanying text (suggesting a broader scope for congressional en-
forcement of the Equal Protection Clause, as compared with the other provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
217 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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the Court held that Amendment 2's very breadth constituted a literal
violation of the equal protection guarantee. 2 8 However, Romeds sec-
ond rationale was much more prosaic: The Court held that the law
simply lacked a rational link to any legitimate justification.219 Of
course that lack of linkage was suggested by Amendment 2's unique
breadth; nevertheless, the principle underlying the Court's second
rationale was, as the Court noted, "conventional and venerable."220
It cannot seriously be argued that employment discrimination is a
burden so broad as to constitute a literal violation of equal protection
as was Amendment 2. Thus, in order for Romer to support the proposi-
tion that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination is con-
stitutionally irrational, it may be necessary to make the more conven-
tional argument that the sexual orientation-based employment
discrimination prohibited in ENDA simply fails the standard rational
basis test. Much of this argument has been made above;221 however,
one piece remains. This sub-part of the argument considers the limits
on ENDA's anti-discrimination rule and examines whether those lim-
its succeed in narrowing its scope to government conduct that is most
arguably unconstitutional.
b. ENDA's Limitations
Several provisions of ENDA limit the scope of its prohibition on
sexual orientation-based employment discrimination. First, ENDA
makes proving sexual orientation discrimination harder than proving
discrimination based on other criteria by providing that disparate im-
pact is insufficient to make out a claim of discrimination.2 22 Not only
does this limitation make it harder to prove an ENDA claim than, say,
a Title VI-based claim, 223 but, more importantly, it links ENDA to the
intent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.224 Even more,
making mere disparate impact insufficient makes successful ENDA
claims more reflective of the Court's concern in Romer-namely, that
218 See Rone, 517 U.S. at 626, 627.
219 See id. at 631, 635.
iRd. at 635.
221 See supra notes 182-216 and accompanying text.
222 Compare S. 1284, 107th Cong. §4(f) (2001), and H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. §4(f)
(2001), zith BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
81-114 (1996) (describing adverse impact claims under Title VII).2
n See id.
224 SeeWashington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (requiring discriminatory intent
before an equal protection violation can be made out).
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Amendment 2 was motivated by animus, a conscious desire to burden
a person based on a particular trait. Thus, while tying the ENDA stan-
dard to the violation in Roner makes an ENDA claim harder to prove,
the claims that do survive are more likely to reflect the unconstitu-
tional animus that underlay the constitutional problem in Romer 225
Second, ENDA excludes from its purview any claim relating to
provision of benefits for spouses or unmarried partners.226 Without
this provision, such a claim (whether ultimately successful or not)
would flow naturally from a general prohibition against sexual orien-
tation discrimination, since states generally provide benefits only for
spouses and children, and since no state recognizes same-sex mar-
riages. By excluding such claims, ENDA focuses more narrowly on
employment discrimination concerns completely divorced from any
state interest in limiting marriage (or the benefits thereof) to hetero-
sexual couples. The point here is that, unless courts are willing to in-
terpret federal equal protection guarantees as requiring states to
make marriage available to same-sex couples, the limiting of marriage
to opposite-sex couples will be held, by hypothesis, constitutionally
rational. 227 If so, then job-related sexual orientation discrimination
could also be considered rational if it is justified as a way of prevent-
ing gay employees from demanding, as a component of workplace
equality, job-related benefits for their partners that "undermine" the
special status states accord the marriage relationships the state has
reserved for opposite-sex couples. By excluding that issue from its
purview, ENDA focuses on the aspect of state conduct-discrimina-
tion in the simple act of employment, unrelated to spousal benefits-
that does not implicate the state's interests with regard to marriage. 228
225 If it is true that suict scrutiny is reserved for classifications that the Court believes
are rarely relevant to legitimate government interests, it makes doctrinal sense to limit
sexual orientation discrimination as a Section 5 matter to intentional discrimination.
While disparate impact on the basis of a ground like race does not by itself call for strict
scrutiny, see, e.g., id. at 242, the fact that race is so disfavored as a classification tool might
make it justifiable to consider disparate impact stronger evidence of animus in that area, as
opposed to sexual orientation. At least, this would be consistent with the relegation of
sexual orientation to rational basis review. Compare, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 88 (2000) ("[D]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,
and we have never held that Section 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably pro-
phylactic legislation.").
226 See, e.g., S. 1284, § 6, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1276, § 6, 106th Cong. (1999).
227 This is not to comment on the correctness of such a holding. It is, instead, to view
ENDA within the fabric of the law as it is likely to exist for at least the near future.
228 The Vermont Supreme Court, of course, has ruled that the state constitution's
common benefits" clause requires that at least some version of marriage and its benefits
be made available to same-sex couples. See generally Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt.
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Third, other provisions of ENDA, while not directly applicable to
states, underscore its overall limited nature. First, ENDA has no appli-
cation to the military, thus exempting the institution that, because of
its uniqueness, presents a different argument for excluding gays and
lesbians.229 Second, the statute exempts businesses with fewer than
fifteen employees. 230 Finally, the statute exempts religious organiza-
tions. These latter two limitations reflect a respect for free association
and free exercise values embodied in the First Amendment when
those values might be most threatened by a non-discrimination
rule.231 While a state would not fall under the "small employer" excep-
tion and while Establishment Clause concerns presumably mean that
a state would not be affected by the exemption for religious organiza-
tions,23 2 these exemptions reflect again the bill's concern for targeting
1999). This has led to the now well-known Vermont institution of "civil union." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, Ch. 1 §§ 4 & 8, h. 23, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000). Still, the fact remains that
Vermont is alone in recognizing such a relationship; moreover, other states have taken
affirmative steps to refuse to recognize same-sex relationships that other jurisdictions may
have legally recognized. See NancyJ. Feather, Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State
ConstitutionalLaw, 70 Tlnm. L. REv. 1017, 1019-21, 1033 (1997). Regardless of the ultimate
constitutional fate of such refusals, complete equality for same-sex relationships is unlikely
in the near future. Thus, ENDA confronts a legal landscape that will continue to feature
official privileging of opposite-sex relationships. In turn, this reality will require ENDA, as a
measure to remedy and ensure constitutional rights as currently understood, to be consis-
tent with this privileging.
229 This is not to suggest that the argument is sufficient; instead, it simply acknowl-
edges the reality that the military presents a different and more difficult case for sexual
orientation discrimination when compared with other, more ordinary, workplaces.
2" See, e.g., S. 869, 105th Cong. § 3(3) (1997); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. § 3(3) (1997).
231 The importance of a Section 5 enactment not infringing on other constitutional
rights derives, at least indirectly, from the Morgan Court's insistence, in response to Justice
Harlan's dissent in that case, that its broad reading of Congress' Section 5 authority did
not empower Congress to draft legislation limiting Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compare
384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (majority opinion), with id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Specifically, the Morgan Court rejected the argument that the challenged statute itself vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by invidiously discriminating among non-English in-
structed individuals, favorably treating those educated in Puerto Rican schools and disfa-
voring those educated in non-American flag schools. Id. at 657. The Court rejected this
argument because it characterized the statute as a reform measure that sought to increase
voting rights. Id. However, the Court left open the possibility that there might be an equal
protection problem with a state literacy law that classified between graduates of American-
flag and foreign schools. See id.; see also Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 653, 676-77 (2000) (discussing this aspect of Morgan). This is not to suggest that
ENDA presents a serious risk of infringing anyone's rights. The point, instead, is simply to
note that ENDA can be conceived of as a statute of limited scope (and thus "appropriate"
Section 5 legislation), its limitations marked in part by the borders of other constitutional
rights that it respects.
232 Proposed increases in the scope of government assistance for faith-based organiza-
tions, to the extent they survive constitutional challenge and are implemented by the
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only that conduct that society considers so worthless as to be irra-
tional. Indeed, these exceptions tie in closely to the justifications
Colorado offered in defense of Amendment 2, justifications that,
while the Court did not believe (because Amendment 2 went so much
further), the Court never said were illegitimate.2 33
Taken together, ENDA's limitations narrow the class of prohib-
ited conduct to that which is most arguably unconstitutional. The dis-
allowance of disparate impact claims focuses the statute on conduct
that is purposely directed at gays and lesbians and thus most likely to
be motivated by unconstitutional animus. The other limitations ex-
clude from ENDA's purview situations where such purposeful dis-
crimination might be constitutional, either because the state might be
thought to have a legitimate interest (limiting its recognition of
committed relationships to heterosexual marriages or, in the case of
the federal government, recognizing the special needs of the mili-
tary234) or because a competing private interest has some constitu-
tional stature (such as free religious exercise or a right to associate).
E. Going Beyond Actual Violations: ENDA as Remedial or
Prophylactic Legislation
Assuming, however, that ENDA does not prohibit only conduct
that is unconstitutional-in other words, assuming that states some-
times constitutionally engage in the type of employment discrimina-
states, may nevertheless raise some issue here. The example would be a state that provides
assistance to a faith-based organization, whose sexual orientation discrimination then
somehow becomes state action (the "somehow" alluding to the difficulty that would inhere
in conceiving of the state as the actor for this purpose, but not when the organization ac-
tually goes out and acts in a religious way). In such a convoluted and potentially internally
contradictory situation, ENDA's religious exemption would inure to the benefit of states.
For an example of a fact pattern that comes close (though not precisely on point), see
Employment Discrimination Against Gays & Lesbians, http://www.religioustolerance.org/
homempl.htni (last modified May 12, 2000) (detailing case of state-funded faith-based
charity allegedly discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation).
233 See supra note 177 and accompanying text; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996).
234 Again, the fact that the party's whose interests are being considered, here, the fed-
eral government, is not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment means that this argument
provides only indirect support for the proposition that ENDA is targeted at conduct that
violates that Amendment. That indirect support, though, is significant, as it reflects the
bill's overall concern for not intruding on other valid interests. Compare City of Boerne %,
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (concluding that RFRA is not proportional to any Free
Exercise Clause violations committed by the states, in part because the statute works a
"considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general
authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens").
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tion ENDA prohibits-the inquiry shifts to whether the statute is a
congruent and proportional response to conduct that is in fact un-
constitutional. Even under the Court's newer, stricter test for Section
5 legislation, the Court has continued to accept the appropriateness
of legislation that bans a "broader swath" of conduct than that actually
prohibited by the Constitution in order to deter violations of the con-
stitutional rule.235 To determine whether such broader legislation
represents an appropriate remedy or deterrent, the Court examines
whether, first, the legislation is a congruent and proportional re-
sponse to those violations and, second, whether there is a pattern and
practice of such violations that may have evaded the Court's own
eyes.236
1. Is ENDA Congruent and Proportional?
Under the Court's post-City of Boerne v. Flores jurisprudence, con-
gruence and proportionality require that there be some relationship
between the statute justified under the Section 5 power and the un-
derlying constitutional violation. While this concept is not particularly
novel,23 7 cases starting with City of Boerne have required a tighter fit
between the statute and the violation.2 38 In Kimel, Florida Prepaid v. Col-
lege Savings Bank, and Garrett, the Court struck down the statutes be-
cause they swept too broadly in relation to the constitutional violation
that Congress was assertedly enforcing, prohibiting too much state
conduct that was in fact constitutional without a showing that states
were engaging in significant amounts of unconstitutional conduct.239
In two of the modern cases, the Court contrasted the statutes at issue
with provisions of the Voting Rights Act that were upheld because of
their limited scope in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.2 40 These modern
23 Seesupra note 133 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-91 (2000) (applying the "con-
gruence and proportionality" test, followed by a consideration of whether Congress found
the existence of a more serious constitutional problem than perceived by the Court).
237 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650, 651 (1996) (laying out general
principles for evaluating the appropriateness of legislation justified under Section 5).
2m See Post & Siegel, supra note 135, at 477 (finding parallels between the Court's re-
cent Section 5jurisprudence and strict scrutiny).239 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
240 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997). The City of Boerne Court wrote:
This is not to say, of course, that § 5 legislation requires termination dates,
geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates. Where, however, a congres-
sional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort
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cases stand in stark contrast to the deferential standard of review
enunciated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, which approached rational basis
at least in form and perhaps also in application.2 41
Is ENDA sufficiently closely related to unconstitutional sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination so as to survive this
test? In part the answer to this question must derive from the earlier
question, whether the discrimination prohibited by ENDA can ever be
considered constitutionally rational. If it cannot, that is, if such dis-
crimination is always so irrational as to violate the Equal Protection
Clause, then there is perfect congruence between ENDA and the con-
stitutional violations Congress has the power to prevent under even
the narrowest reading of Section 5.242 As discussed above, however, it
is at least possible that the Court would read Romer sufficiently nar-
rowly (as a holding dictated by the unusually broad scope of Amend-
ment 2)243 and ENDA's prohibitions sufficiently broadly as to con-
clude that ENDA did not simply prohibit conduct the Court would
itself consider violations of equal protection.2 44 Thus, this Article now
considers ENDA as prophylactic legislation going beyond the actual
equal protection guarantee and thereby subject to the congruence
and proportionality test.
to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind
tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under
§ 5.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
241 See 384 U.S. at 653 ("It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of the
factors [leading Congress to conclude that § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act was necessary to
secure the equal protection rights of Puerto Ricans in the United States]. It is enough that
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it
did."). Motgan applied this same deferential standard to congressional determinations of
the substance of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Morgan court
wrote:
Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might
predicate a judgment that tie application of New York's English literacy re-
quirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education
in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than
English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
See id. at 656.
242 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
244 Compare Kimel v Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86-89 (2000) (describing the
breadth of the ADEA and the narrowness of its exceptions as evidence of its lack of pro-
portionality compared with the relatively insignificant constitutional problem it sought to
address).
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Most of the ENDA limitations relevant to the congruence and
proportionality inquiry have already been discussed above, in the dis-
cussion whether ENDA is limited to prohibiting constitutionally irra-
tional government employment discrimination.2 45 It should be unsur-
prising that the same factors are relevant to both inquiries: Even if
ENDA's limitations do not exactly track the conduct that the Court
would find unconstitutional, those limits would still support an argu-
ment that ENDA was carefully tailored so as to remain proportionate
to the constitutional violations it sought to remedy. As noted above,
the most important of these limits are the prohibition on disparate
impact claims and on claims for spousal benefits for same-sex part-
ners. Also significant, if indirectly, are the exemptions for the military,
religious organizations, and small employers. Taken together, these
limits restrict ENDA's scope to situations that are quite arguably con-
sistently unconstitutional. But even if ENDA, so limited, continues to
prohibit conduct the Court would find constitutional, these limits
significantly restrict ENDA's scope and focus it much more closely on
unconstitutional conduct.
In addition to the limits discussed above, two other provisions of
ENDA further limit its scope and are especially relevant to the con-
gruence and proportionality inquiry. First, ENDA explicitly refrains
from handicapping employers' enforcement of general codes of sex-
ual conduct that are designed and implemented in a sexual orienta-
tion-neutral fashion.246 This provision limits ENDA's scope by exempt-
ing situations where the employer might claim that the adverse
employment action was based on sexual conduct, not sexual orienta-
tion. By allowing at least some sexual conduct to serve as the basis for
an adverse employment action, the exemption goes some distance
toward cabining ENDA to cases of pure orientation. This, in turn,
keeps the statute responsive (or congruent) to the status/conduct dis-
tinction created by the combination of Romer and Hardwick.
Obviously, this provision does not completely track the
status/conduct distinction: For a state employer to cite sexual mis-
conduct as the reason for an adverse employment decision, the mis-
conduct must be nonprivate and based on sexual orientation-neutral
grounds. Thus, for example, ENDA would still prohibit a state from
firing an employee because she had sex with her female partner in
the privacy of their home. Indeed, ENDA also would still prohibit a
245 See supra notes 222-234 and accompanying text.
246 See, e.g., S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 11 (1999).
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state from firing an employee because the state had a sodomy law re-
stricted to homosexual conduct, since the sexual conduct rule would
not be orientation neutral. Thus, the sexual misconduct exemption
does not give states complete freedom to cite conduct as the reason
for the dismissal. For that reason, the exemption may limit states
more than the Constitution (as interpreted in Hardwick) does.247 Still,
the exemption serves to keep the statute focused on irrational status-
based discrimination and thus proportional to the underlying consti-
tutional violation.
Second, ENDA prohibits affirmative action, quotas, or preferen-
tial treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, whether imposed by
an employer or a court as part of an order or consent decree.248 While
this provision may be a politically savvy response to the argument that
anti-discrimination laws confer "special rights, '249 the legal effect of
this provision is to prevent a well-meaning employer or court from
responding to discrimination by ordering or implementing a remedy
that outruns the original statutory violation.2 50 Thus, not only are
ENDA's limits closely tied to the prohibitions of the Equal Protection
Clause, but in turn, implementation of those limits is closely tied to
what the statute requires and goes no further.
In sum, several arguments converge to present a plausible argu-
ment that ENDA survives the congruence and proportionality test.
First, much garden-variety sexual orientation-based employment dis-
crimination has to be considered irrational. Second, ENDA limits its
prohibitions to those instances where there is purposeful discrimina-
tion against homosexuals and thus a greater likelihood of unconstitu-
tional animus. Third, ENDA limits its scope when it confronts areas
where either the state has a potentially legitimate interest (such as
"protecting" heterosexual marriage or discouraging certain conduct)
or, more indirectly relevant, where private parties may have constitu-
tionally cognizable countervailing interests. Fourth, the statute pro-
247 C'ompare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 196 (1986) (approving of morality as a
legitimate reason to ban homosexual sodomy).
248 See, e.g., S. 1276, 106th Cong. § 12(d) (1999) (affirmative action prohibition); S.
1276, 106th Cong. § 8 (1999) (quota and preferential treatment prohibitions).
249 See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS 102-10 (1999) (dis-
cussing polling data from Colorado in the period leading up to the vote on Amendment
2).
250 Normally, courts' equitable power is broad-ranging and includes the power to enter
and monitor compliance with consent decrees that require the parties to do more than
what the underlying law requires. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 389 (1992).
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hibits employer or judicial remedies from outrunning the underlying
constitutional violation. If a statute may be congruent to constitu-
tional violations in an area the Court itself has not heavily involved
itself in, ENDA seems to be it.
2. Have States Engaged in a Pattern and Practice of Unconstitutional
Employment Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians?
In determining whether a pattern and practice of conduct exists,
thus making remedial or prophylactic legislation appropriate Section
5 legislation, the current doctrine demands (1) a pattern of (2) rele-
vant (3) unconstitutional conduct (4) by states. 251 In this case, the un-
constitutional conduct would be state government sexual orientation-
based employment discrimination that is unconstitutionally irrational.
Garrett provides the clearest guidance on what the Court might de-
mand. In Garrett, the Court acknowledged the finding in the ADA that
discrimination on the basis of disability "continue[s] to be a serious
and pervasive social problem"2 2 and conceded that that conclusion
was supported by evidence assembled by Congress. 25 3 However, the
Court refused to consider such findings and evidence relevant, since
the "great majority" of the incidents cited in the record did not in-
volve states.2M Having limited the field of inquiry to examples of con-
duct engaged in by state governments, the Court then further limited
the field to examples of conduct by state governments in the field of
employment.25 5 Rejecting Justice Breyer's compilation of state dis-
criminatory conduct against the disabled, the Court stated that "only
a small fraction" of the incidents Justice Breyer cited dealt with em-
ployment.25 6 According to the Court, "the overwhelming majority" of
those incidents alleged discrimination by states in the provision of
public services and public accommodations, areas addressed by other
parts of the ADA not challenged in Garrett.2 5 7 Finally, the Court ques-
tioned whether the examples provided of state government employ-
25 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 965 (2001) (restricting
the appropriate field of inquiry to conduct by states, not including units of local govern-
ments such as cities or counties).
252 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2) (1994)).
253 See id.
254 See id.
55 See id.
m Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 n.7.
27 See id.
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ment discrimination reflected unconstitutional conduct on the states'
part.258
After Garrett, then, plaintiffs (and Congress) face a difficult task
of compiling a detailed record including examples of the specific vio-
lations the statute seeks to remedy. The question, then, is whether the
phenomenon of sexual orientation-based employment discrimination
is easily susceptible to the compilation of such a record.
The normal way of developing any legislative record would be for
Congress to look at the issue, seek out evidence, and find facts based
on the evidence it examined. In the case of discrimination, though,
the possibility always exists that such an examination will not reveal
the true extent of the problem. Indeed, the Court's Section 5 juris-
prudence recognizes this difficulty. Proof problems not only lay be-
hind the Court's willingness to allow Congress, under Section 5, to
prohibit more conduct than required by Section 1259 but also help ex-
plain the alrgan Court's overall deference to legislative judgments
regarding the need for particular restrictions on state conduct in or-
der to guarantee Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 60
It is important to distinguish between these two versions of the
proof problem. In Kimel, for example, the Court reaffirmed the con-
cept enunciated in City of Rome v. United States that Congress had the
power under Section 5 "to remedy and to deter violation of rights
guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a some-
what broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself for-
bidden by the Amendment's text. 2 61 In order to use Section 5 to en-
act such broader prohibitions, however, the Kimel Court insisted that
there be a record of a problem that demanded such a broad remedy
and concluded that Congress had created no such record.262 By con-
trast, the Court in City of Rome reiterated earlier cases' conclusions
258 See id. at 964-65, 966.
259 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980); see also Garrett, 121 S. Ct.
at 963; Kimel v Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997); cf supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting Professor Tribe's
comparison of the City of Rome "wider net" theory to a rule of evidence).
260 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("'It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.'") (quoting City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (in turn quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)));
Moigan, 384 U.S. at 651 (Section 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
261 528 U.S. at 81.
262 See id. at 88-91.
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that the Voting Rights Act was justified by legislative factfinding about
southern states' attempts to infringe on African-Americans' voting
rights.26 3 These proof problems come together, though, when consid-
ering the appropriateness of prophylactic legislation: If a discrimina-
tion problem requires a broad remedy because the discrimination is
easy to disguise, it might well be that Congress will have a similarly
difficult time uncovering the problem and creating an airtight record
of its existence. In such a situation, the Court would be faced with the
choice of deferring to Congress' determination (perhaps without
overwhelming evidentiary support) that a problem existed or allow-
ing the very insidiousness of the problem to serve as a shield from
remedial legislation.
In the case of age- or disability-based discrimination it is easy to
imagine the problem. Such discrimination can be veiled under non-
objectionable criteria such as merit or efficiency, thus making the ac-
tual violation hard to spot and broader remedial rules acceptable.
The problem is magnified if we take a broader view of the harm
caused by such discrimination. If that discrimination not only harms
those who actually are employed or apply for employment, but also
deters many people from seeking work, then the extent of the dis-
crimination may well touch individuals well-hidden from congres-
sional investigation, not to mention as a practical matter unable to sue
to enforce their right to equal treatment.2 4 In such cases, the best
factfinding that could be expected would yield only a rough under-
20 See446 U.S. at 174.
M For example, there would be a serious question whether someone deterred from
seeking work because of suspected discrimination by the would-be employer would have
standing to sue in federal court given the relatively strict causal links required for a plain-
tiff to have standing. Compare, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504, 505 (1975) (denying
standing to would-be residents of a township alleged to have engaged in discriminatory
zoning on the ground that it was unclear whether the zoning decisions had in fact caused
home builders to not build the low-cost housing the plaintiffs could afford). This is not an
insurmountable hurdle, however. For example, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995), the Court allowed a white-owned contractor to challenge a government set-
aside policy and seek forward-looking relief without requiring it to prove that it would be
the low bidder. Instead, the Court characterized the injury as impacting the plaintiffs
ability to compete on equal footing with other contractors, regardless of whether plaintiff
could show that it would have been successful in that competition. So too in the example
in the text, a plaintiff discouraged from applying for work might be able to argue that she
was deprived of her ability to compete fairly for a job, even though it was unknowable
whether she would in fact have gotten the job had she applied and had the employer not
discriminated. Still, the Adarand example enjoys a tighter causal link, if for no other reason
than because the contractor in that case had bid on construction jobs before, and thus it
could be presumed that the contractor would do so again.
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standing of the scope of the problem based on unreliable and impre-
cise mechanisms such as surveys (for example, "if you knew that you
wouldn't be discriminated against because of your age/disability,
would you seek work?").265 Nevertheless, the Court in Garrett did not
seem moved by these difficulties confronting Congress. In the face of
a congressional finding of overall societal discrimination against the
disabled 266 and the presentation of a large number of instances of
their disparate treatment,267 the Court nevertheless faulted Congress
for failing to provide specific examples of conduct by states,268 relating
to employment discrimination, 269 that constituted unconstitutional
conduct.270
This evidentiary problem may be even more severe in the context
of sexual orientation discrimination. What makes sexual orientation
different from age or disability-or almost any other objectionable
criterion for discriminating-is that sexual orientation can be hidden.
It may be practically impossible for blacks to hide their race, for
women to hide their gender, for the elderly to hide their age, or for
the disabled to hide their disability, but it is not only possible, but in
many situations the norm for gays and lesbians to hide their sexual
orientation. 271 That fact makes it all the more difficult to compile a
reliable record of sexual orientation discrimination, especially in the
workplace, where it is normally relatively easy for a lesbian to hide her
orientation, and apparently quite common. 272 While, for example, a
heterosexual woman would not be "coming out" if she complained
about discriminatory treatment, a lesbian might well be, and thus
would bear an extra burden in disclosing the discrimination, whether
265 Indeed, to the extent that such indirect methods are necessary in order to ascertain
the existence of discrimination, congressional (as opposed to judicial) action may be
called for, since in such situations it may be difficult to structure a legal claim that meets
the requisites of an Article III case or controversy Compare, e.g., Marth, 422 U.S. at 508 (de-
nying standing to plaintiffs on the ground that the causal chain between the defendants'
actions and the plaintiffs' injuries was too speculative).
2-66 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (1994); see also Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
121 S. Ct. 955, 966 (2001) (quoting this finding).
267 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 977-93 (Appendix C to opinion of BreyerJ., dissenting); see
also id. at 966 (responding to Appendix C).
268 See id. at 965.
269 See id. at 966 n.7.
270 See id. at 965-67.
271 A Philadelphia survey found that 76% of gay nien and 81% of lesbians said they
concealed their sexual orientation in their workplace. SeeJA'MES D. WOODS &JAY H. Luc S,
THE CORPORATE CLOSET 8 (1993).
272 See id.
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to a government investigator, ajournalist, or her attorney.273 Nor, con-
trary to Justice Kennedy's suggestion in his Garrett concurrence,
would prior litigation patterns necessarily reveal the existence or
scope of the problem if the offending conduct resulted "only" in a gay
person remaining closeted at work.274 Indeed, since only one or two
overt acts of discrimination might suffice to keep all gays at that
workplace closeted, the scope of the problem might substantially ex-
ceed the amount of any litigation.275
Moreover, forcing a gay man or lesbian to stay in the closet at
work--on pain of official action such as firing or demotion or
unofficial action such as harassment or threatened or actual violence-
could very easily be considered discriminatory in itself, to the extent
that the workplace tolerates statements of, or openness about, hetero-
sexual orientation.2 76 Of course, it would be even harder for Congress
to construct a record of that kind of evidence, at least in the sense re-
quired by the Court up to now-that is, with actual examples of indi-
vidual violations in which there was a direct causal link between the
employer's conduct and the harm suffered by the employee.2 77
Because of this hidden nature of the discrimination problem,
there would be a stronger argument for deferring to legislative
factfinding that was based not on explicit examples of wrongdoing
(such as lawsuits or even complaints to EEOC-type offices) but instead
on more aggregate studies that document this phenomenon in gen-
eral. And it is, of course, exactly that type of factfinding that courts
273 Of course, this is not to minimize the difficulties faced by other groups, such as
women, when they complain about discrimination. It is merely to point out that the option
of the closet means that a lesbian's decision to complain imposes on her an additional
burden not borne by others whose membership in the burdened group is already obvious
to all.
274 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 (KennedyJ., concurring).
275 The situation is different when there is discrimination by the employer, or harass-
ment by co-workers, on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. In that case, the victim
has been "outed" (whether accurately or not, since the basis of the negative treatment is
only a perception), and the closet has been taken away as an option. On the other hand,
such punitive outings (whether accurate or not) might aggravate the closetedness of other
employees, thus creating a larger problem, again hidden from the typical record-creating
methods the Court appears to favor in Section 5 cases.
276 For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination under any terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1994).
277 Presumably, such evidence would have to suggest the existence of an injury from
having to stay in the closet, and some causal link between that injury and the need to stay
in the closet at the workplace in particular. Whether such injury, assuming it can be
identified, can be parceled out in terms of its causation is questionable, at least with the
degree of precision the Court seems to have required in Garrett.
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are incompetent to perform and where deference to the legislature is
thus most appropriate. Whether the Court would be willing to credit
such factfinding is unclear, given its recent insistence on actual exam-
ples of unconstitutional conduct performed by states.2 78
In sum, then, litigants may well be able to demonstrate both
ENDA's congruence and proportionality and the existence of the un-
derlying discrimination but only if courts recognize the breadth and
inchoate nature of both discriminatory conduct and the harms there-
from. A fair test of ENDA as appropriate Section 5 legislation would
also require courts to understand the uniqueness of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. These difficulties require that Congress
consider carefully its factfinding responsibility. The next Part of this
Article evaluates the factfinding reflected in current versions of ENDA
and offers suggestions for further investigation and findings of fact
that the Court might find useful in its Section 5 inquiry.
III. (UNSOLICITED) ADVICE TO CONGRESS
The Court's new Section 5 jurisprudence clearly requires more
from Congress in the way of proof. This requirement applies espe-
cially when the statute addresses an area the Court itself has not con-
sidered particularly problematic from an equal protection standpoint.
City of Boerne v. Flores, Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett all criticized the lack of evidence that states were engaging in
widespread constitutional violations.279 Garrett also criticized the lack
of actual legislative findings of such violations. 280 Under these cases,
then, drafters of ENDA should consider carefully both the findings
ultimately made in the bill and their evidentiary support in the legis-
lative record.
A. Doctmentation and Findings ofActual Government Bias Against Gays
and Lesbians in Hiring
An obvious place to start with legislative investigation is the exis-
tence and scope of state government employment bias against gays
278 See, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-
91 (2000).
279 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-966; Kiniel, 528 U.S. at 89-91; Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644-47 (1999); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 531 (1997).
280 See 121 S. Ct. at 966.
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and lesbians. This should not be surprising: Statutes justified under
Section 5 must identify the unconstitutional conduct triggering con-
gressional action. Still, Garrett and the other recent Section 5 cases
make this documentation task more challenging than under earlier
cases such as Katzenbach v. Morgan, even assuming that Morgan would
have required such evidence. 281
Several problems might arise with regard to Congress' documen-
tation of sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. First, as
noted earlier, the option of the closet makes documentation of actual
workplace discrimination harder for sexual orientation claims, as op-
posed to claims based on other characteristics such as age or race. 282
Indeed, the pressure gays may feel to stay in the closet could itself be
considered an aspect of workplace discrimination, an aspect which
would be even more difficult to document. Thus, the Court's insis-
tence on the presentation of actual examples of unconstitutional
conduct in numbers amounting to a pattern of such behavior by the
states seems at first glance inappropriate to the inquiry with regard to
sexual orientation.
Still, the examples of intentional discrimination against gays and
lesbians are, sadly, sufficiently numerous that a lengthy record of such
conduct perpetrated by states could easily be compiled by Congress.283
And since such intentional discrimination will so rarely be motivated
by a reason sufficiently rational to satisfy equal protection, most of the
examples found will most likely qualify as instances of unconstitu-
tional discrimination and thus directly support ENDA's validity.
Second, while under City of Rome v. United States government prac-
tices having a disparate impact might be viewed as justifying broader
remedial legislation if Congress determines that such disparate im-
281 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (stating that it was only neces-
sary for the Court to perceive a basis for the prophylactic action taken by Congress); see
also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable his-
tory of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimina-
tion, it -as proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.") (footnote
omitted), Conpare, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66 (requiring particularized findings of
unconstitutional action by state governments).
= See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
m A brief perusal of the Internet reveals several sites dedicated to documenting anti-
gay actions, including employment discrimination. See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign,
Documenting Discrimination (documenting examples of private and public sector dis-
crimination, including employment discrimination, based on sexual orientation), at
http://wv.hrc.org/publications/pdf/DocumentingDiscrimination.pdf (last visited Nov.
25,2001).
20021
Boston College Third World Law Journal
pact suggests the presence of intentional, invidious discrimination, 284
it might be harder to convince the Court that government actions
having a disparate impact on gays hide an invidious intent. As noted
earlier, ENDA disallows disparate impact claims.2 85 Nevertheless,
findings of disparate impact could be useful to a court when consider-
ing ENDA's constitutionality, as they might suggest the existence of
invidious discrimination.
Still, the Court might have a problem with this latter approach.
First, the possibility of a gay or lesbian employee remaining in the
closet may lead the Court to wonder whether the asserted disparate
impact actually exists. Of course, this is ironic: A homosexual's self-
infliction of the closet would cause the additional harm of casting
doubt on the existence of the discrimination. Second, the Court may
view homosexuality as more of a cultural phenomenon than, say, ra-
cial identity, with the result that the claimed disparate impact may be
viewed not as a result of intentional discrimination but instead as a
result of employment or career choices made by gays or lesbians.2 86 At
any rate, these factors could easily be expected to hover in the back of
the Court's mind, leading it perhaps to demand more before dispa-
rate impact would be seen as persuasive evidence of discriminatory
intent.
B. Documentation of the Relative Likelihood of Sex Crimes by Homosexuals
and Heterosexuals
This may sound like an odd subject with which Congress should
concern itself. However, it may be something that is necessary, and
certainly useful, in getting ENDA past the hurdle posed by Bowers v.
Hardwick. Essentially, evidence that homosexuals engage in illegal
sexual activity as much as heterosexuals would call into question the
rationality of a state argument (or a court making the state's argu-
ment under the rational basis test) that employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation is an appropriate way of ensuring that the
284 See 446 U.S. at 177.
285 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
286 Indeed, in the context of race, where the Court uses what is arguably a similar strict
scrutiny standard, compare Post & Siegel, supra note 135, at 677, the Court discounted such
disparate result data, wondering whether the data reflected not so much discrimination
but instead career choices made by African Americans. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989). As in Croson, the Court might require Congress to make a
stronger showing that the disparate result was attributable to discrimination and not to
choices made by gays. See id.
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state not hire persons likely to violate the law. This sort of factfinding,
for which there is empirical evidence in the social science literature,287
is the sort most likely to be accepted by the Court. It deals with social
reality, not legal concepts that might lead the Court to suspect that
Congress was attempting to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.288
Moreover, its social science/empirical basis makes it the type of issue
where Congress' competence is most pronounced, relative to the
Court's.
A problem with this analysis is the existence of sodomy statutes
that restrict only same-sex conduct. Currently, six states maintain sod-
omy statutes that apply only to same-sex conduct.289 This fact raises
the specter of a court questioning Congress' finding, since, at least in
those states, only same-sex sodomy is a crime. This raises an interest-
ing, potentially circular argument: Gays and lesbians can be discrimi-
nated against in the workplace because they are more likely to com-
mit sex crimes, and they are more likely to commit sex crimes because
some sex crime statutes are targeted at same-sex conduct. Once again,
Hardwick intrudes into the equal protection argument due to the
complex relationship between conduct and status. However, there is
at least reason to wonder whether sodomy statutes confined to same-
sex conduct remain viable after Romer v. Evans. Moreover, this prob-
lem becomes less pressing as the number of states with sodomy laws
falls, as those laws are either repealed or struck down under state con-
stitutional principles. 290
287 See Booth, supra note 194, at 1260 (citing studies); Captain John A. Carr, The Differ-
ence Between Can and Should: Able v. United States and the ContinuingDebate About Homosex-
ual Conduct in the Military, 46 A.E L. REv. 1, 7-8 nn.26-29 (1999) (same).
28 An example of the latter type of finding that the Court might reject would be one,
made perhaps in response to Florida Prepaid, that states were depriving patent holders of
property "ithout due process." See 527 U.S. 627, 641-43 (1999). Compare City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997) (rejecting what the Court considered Con-
gress'Congress's attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause under the guise of its
enforcement power under Section 5).
m See Tony Varona, EqualJustie: Federal and State Courts Continue to Shape Lesbian and
Gay Equal Rights, HRC Q., Spring 1999,available at http://www.hrc.org/publications/hrcq/
hrcq99sp/pg17.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2001).
2 See id. (noting that courts in four states have recently invalidated their sodomy
laws); see also, e.g., http://www.geocities.com/privacylaws/legal.htm (describing case law
from numerous states where the courts have struck down the state's sodomy law as uncon-
stituional).
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C. The Irrationality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Finally, it makes sense for Congress to discuss in its findings the
irrationality of sexual orientation discrimination in government
workplaces. Previous versions of ENDA have recited findings about
the lack of a relationship between an individual's sexual orientation
and his or her ability to contribute to the economic life of the na-
tion.291 Still, Kimel and especially Garrett suggest that the Court would
not consider such a finding dispositive. In Kimel, the Court ignored
the legislative findings that employers imposed "arbitrary" age limits
on workers. 292 Instead, the Court concluded, based on its own investi-
gation of the record, that Congress had not found sufficient instances
of age discrimination that were so irrational as to violate equal protec-
tion.293 Kirnel, however, does not fully resolve the question of the
Court's response to Congress' findings, since in the ADEA the refer-
ence to "arbitrary" age limits may well have been to the simple draw-
ing of a bright line age cut-off rather than an age limit that was neces-
sarily "arbitrary" in the sense of being unreasonable or irrational.
In Garrett, however, the Court faced somewhat more definite
congressional findings about the irrationality of the type of discrinmi-
nation being outlawed. In the ADA, Congress found the "continuing
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination,"294 which cost the
nation "billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and nonproductivity."295 Similarly, Congress found that in-
dividuals with disabilities "have been faced with restrictions ... result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society." 296 Read
broadly, these findings could be taken as legislative uncovering of a
significant problem with disability-based discrimination that was irra-
tional in the sense of not being justified on a cost-benefit basis. In-
deed, the dissent in Garrett cited these findings in arguing that the
ADA was an appropriate response to that problem.297 The majority,
however, did not discuss these particular findings. Instead, it focused
on the finding that Congress did not make, either in the statute or in
291 See, e.g., S. 2238, 103d Cong. § 2(a) (1) (1994).
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (4), (a)(5) (1994); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
88-91 (2000).
.93 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-91.
-4 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (1995) (emphasis added).
95 Id. § 12101 (a) (9) (emphasis added).
26Id. § 12101 (a) (7).
97 See 121 S. Ct. 955, 971,972 (2001) (Breyei;J., dissenting).
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the committee reports on the bill: Namely, that states engaged in a
pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct 298 with regard to the
employment of disabled persons.2 99
The Court's refusal to credit Congress' findings in the ADA sug-
gests several conclusions. First, and most obviously, legislative findings
must be quite precise in order to satisfy the Court that the accompa-
nying prohibitions are valid Section 5 enactments. In particular, the
findings must refer to states themselves (notjust "society" or "employ-
ers"), and they must refer to irrational or unreasonable conduct. Sec-
ond, and more generally, the Garrett Court may have interpreted such
findings as attempts by Congress to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment to the extent those findings purported to determine that
discrimination against the disabled was often unconstitutionally irra-
tional. In that sense, the Court might have viewed these findings as
analogous to RFRA. Just as RFRA was thought to have represented a
congressional attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause, so too
these findings might have been seen as attempts by Congress to per-
form the rational basis review the Court may have thought was its own
domain.
The first of these concerns-about the precision of Congress'
findings-is easy enough to address in ENDA, assuming that empiri-
cal evidence exists allowing Congress to honestly make the finding.
The second concern, however, raises a more theoretical and difficult
question: To what extent may Congress cast as "findings" statements
that have direct legal significance? For example, if Congress were to
"find" that a particular government act (say, an affirmative action
program) "was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest," would the Court accept that "finding" or discount it as an
obvious attempt to short-circuit the Court's role in performing judi-
cial review?300 An analogy might be found in appellate review of lower
298 See id. at 966 (noting the lack of a legislative finding of unconstitutional conduct by
states); id. (noting that committee reports cited problems with employment discrimination
in the private sector but did not mention government employment).
M See id. at 966 n.7 (stating that most of the examples of state government discrimina-
tion cited by the dissent did not involve employment, and those that did were described so
generally as to make it impossible to know whether they constituted unconstitutional ac-
tion by the state).
3W0 Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (striking down a law
that, according to the Court, prescribed a "rule of decision" for the courts and thus in-
fringed on the judiciary's role), with Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429
(1992). In Seattle Audubon, the Court upheld, against a Kein challenge, a law that "deter-
mined and directed" that U.S. Forest Service compliance with certain new requirements
for managing federal forests "was adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the
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court factfindings. For example, one appellate court (dealing, ironi-
cally, with the question whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect
class) viewed the trial court's determination of that issue as a "'consti-
tutional fact"' that was supported by the trial court's "ultimate facts
and interrelated applications of law, sociological judgments, [and]
mixed questions of law and fact."30' For that reason it reviewed de novo
the trial court's finding.30 2 Full explanations of the constitutional fact
doctrine or the scope of the "clearly erroneous" standard governing
appellate review of trial court fact findings are well beyond the scope
of this Article. 303 However, the analogy should be clear: To the extent
the fact that is found (either by a trial court or Congress) starts to take
on the character of a legal holding, appellate review (or, in the case of
legislatively found facts, judicial review in general) may appropriately
become less deferential.
Regardless, Congress could probably avoid this problem with re-
gard to ENDA because it should be relatively easy to marshal socio-
logical and other social science data supporting the proposition that
sexual orientation has no impact on the factors that are relevant to
successful employment. 04 The empirical nature of this finding makes
it more likely that the Court would credit it as being within Congress'
area of expertise and authority, as opposed to an attempt to engage in
law-interpreting as the Court clearly suspected in City of Boerne.30 5 Put
another way, the empirical nature of the facts found leaves courts with
the ultimate authority to decide how those facts affect the outcome of
statutory requirements that are the basis of" certain pending lawsuits that the statute
identified by name and docket number. Id. at 437, 439. On the difficulty of determining
when legislative action of this sort intrudes into the judicial realm, see generally William D.
Araiza, The Trouble With Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers and the Line Be-
tween Statutory Amendment and Statutory Inteipretation, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055 (1999).
301 Equal. Found. of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 E3d 261, 265 (6th Cir; 1995).
302 See id.
303 See generally, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Reviezi, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
229 (1985).
304 See, e.g., The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA): Testimony Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of the American Psy-
chological Association, available at http://vww.apa.org/ppo/issues/pendatest.htinl (ask-
ing "Are lesbians and gay men psychologically abnormal which would justify work place
discrimination?" and answering "No.") (last visited Nov. 25, 2001). On the recent trend
toward increased use of social science data in gay rights litigation, see generally Patricia J.
Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical
Context, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1994).
305 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (describing the burdensome-
ness of the prohibitions RFRA imposed on states "to illustrate the substantive alteration [of
the Court's earlier interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause] attempted by RFRA").
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a particular legal test, for example, whether a government action was
motivated by a compelling interest or was so "irrational" as to violate
the rational basis test of equal protection.30 6
By contrast, one finding that the Court ignored in Garrett and,
based on the above analysis, is likely to ignore in ENDA concerns the
status of the benefited group as a suspect class. In the ADA, Congress
"found" that the disabled had all the indicia of a suspect class: Accord-
ing to Congress, they were a "discrete and insular minority," "sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment," and "relegated
to a position of political powerlessness, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereo-
typic assumptions not truly indicative of the ability of such individuals
to participate in, and contribute to, society."307 These words could
have come out of the Supreme Court itself (indeed, they have), 308
which may be the reason the Court thinks those determinations be-
long to it rather than to Congress.309
The upshot, then, is that drafters of ENDA may wish to think
about linking findings of the irrationality of sexual orientation-based
employment discrimination to empirical evidence of sexual orienta-
tion's irrelevance to successful employment.310 Such evidence should
306 Obviously, this is not a clean line. "Irrationality" could be found empirically, or it
could be a legal conclusion. Thus, if Congress finds that sexual orientation discrimination
in employment is "irrational," it might be taken as either a statement of empirical reality or
as an attempt to pre-determine the Court's application of the rational basis test. Compare
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (striking down a statute because it pre-
scribed a "rule of decision" for the courts and thus intruded into the judiciary's realm).
Thus, as discussed in the accompanying text, how the Court ultimately reads such a fact
finding may turn on the type of record evidence that supports it.
307 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (7) (1994) ("[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political power-
lessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such indi-
viduals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.").
30s See, e.g., Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (noting the charateristics of
suspect classes);Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (same); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 26 (1973) (same).
so Compare Equal. Found. of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 .3d 261, 265 (6th Cir.
1995).
s0 It might even be helpful, though it seems excessive, to focus this finding specifically
on government employment. This further specificity may seem unnecessary; after all, gov-
ernment employment is not so different in character from employment in the private sec-
tor, and so the irrelevance of sexual orientation discrimination in employment in general
should presumably apply to government employment. But given how much specificity the
Court seems to demand, it may be prudent to provide a finding as narrowly tailored as
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be presented and cited in the legislative history and the bill's findings
themselves, not only because the Court now looks more closely at
congressional findings in general,311 but because these findings may
be construed as either empirical or partially legal due to their special
nature.312
IV. THOUGHTS ON THE COURT'S SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT
OF ENDA's POSSIBLE FATE
The scope of the Section 5 power is a breathtakingly broad topic,
involving issues of the separation of powers, judicial supremacy, fed-
eralism, and the scope of the individual liberties in both the Four-
teenth Amendment itself and, via incorporation, the Bill of Rights.
For this reason, some humility may be called for when attempting to
discern the proper scope of that power. This concluding part of the
Article attempts to offer some modest insights into the Section 5 is-
sue. It proceeds from a proposition broadly accepted by the current
Court: that RFRA was unconstitutional. It then considers why RFRA
may have gone beyond Congress' Section 5 power and applies that
tentative reasoning to federal laws justified as provisions enforcing the
equal protection guarantee. It concludes by considering Congress'
special role in identifying discrimination that society no longer con-
siders reasonable, including sexual orientation discrimination.
A. A First Cut: Congress' Use of Legal Terms of Art
In approaching the issue, it may help to start by thinking about
the one case of those which this Article has discussed that did not
produce a dissent on the Section 5 issue: City of Boerne v. Flores.313 What
was it about RFRA that allowed the Court, sharply divided on so many
of the issues encompassed within the Section 5 issue, to forge some-
this. The same would go for record evidence supporting that finding. See infra text accom-
panying notes 311-312.
311 Cf Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing the Court's review
of the congressional record "as if it were an administrative agency record"). See generally,
e.g., Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agenmy: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731 (1996).
312 See snpra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
313 Justices O'Connor, Soute, and Breyer all dissented, but Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority's analysis of the Section 5 issue, while Justices Souter and Breyer re-
frained from expressing an opinion, resting their positions on whether Smith was properly
decided. See 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997) (O'Connor, J.. dissenting); id. at 565 (Soute, J., dis-
senting); id. at 566 (BreyemJ., dissenting).
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thing of a consensus that RFRA was unconstitutional? One obvious
characteristic of RFRA was that it used legal terms of art, namely,
mandating that government not "substantially burden" 14 a person's
religious exercise unless the burden furthered "a compelling govern-
ment interest"315 and was "the least restrictive means" 16 of furthering
that interest. Initially, our intuition might be that there is something
inappropriate about Congress' use of such "legal" terms. On
reflection, though, that intuition reveals itself as incorrect. For exam-
ple, if Congress thought that any racial disparities in employment
were an abomination that should be allowed only if absolutely neces-
sary, there would be nothing wrong with it using these terms in a stat-
ute mandating racial proportionality in every workplace in the coun-
try unless it was critical that a disparity be maintained. Indeed, using
these terms brings the clarity of a common language: Congress knows
what those terms mean to the courts, and the courts know that Con-
gress knows, with the result that there is increased predictability and
accuracy in the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature.
B. A Second Cut: Judicial Supremacy
A more subtle version of our initial intuition might revolve
around the kind of issue on which Congress was legislating. On this
view, RFRA's problem was that it used these legal terms in an area sub-
ject to the courts' ultimate authority: the meaning of the Constitution.
The sequences of events leading to City of Boerne suggests the problem.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause so as to subject
government action burdening religion to less stringent scrutiny than
the compelling government interest test that had prevailed since Sher-
bert v. Verner317 In RFRA, Congress sought to overturn Smith and rein-
state a version of the Sherbert test.318 In turn, City of Boerne struck RFRA
down as exceeding Congress' power to "enforce" the free exercise
guarantee.3 19
314 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a) (1994).
315 Id. § 2000bb-1 (b) (1).316 Id. § 2000bb-1 (b) (2).
317 See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
318 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the Court's statement in City of
Boerne that RFRA actually went beyond the Sherbert test).
319 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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On the other hand, commentators have argued that this sort of
legislative disapproval of a constitutional law standard is unexcep-
tional and not troubling, at least when the legislative response in-
creases, rather than limits, the scope of the right.320 The existence of a
tradition of such legislative expansions of rights321 provides a trou-
bling response to the argument that fundamental separation of pow-
ers principles, informed by statements of judicial power such as Mar-
bury v. Madison 22 and Cooper v. Aaron,323 flatly foreclose any role for
Congress in interpreting the Constitution.
Further concerns arise when one considers the difference most
commentators perceive 324 between Katzenbach v. Morgan's two ration-
ales for upholding the Voting Rights Act provisions challenged in that
case: First, the theory that Congress may have been seeking to protect
the rights of Puerto Ricans to equal attention from government,
which, in Congress' view, could best be achieved by ensuring their vot-
ing rights; and, second, the theory that Congress could have deter-
mined for itself that the inequality suffered by Puerto Ricans consti-
tuted invidious discrimination and was thus itself unconstitutional. As
the City of Boerne Court conceded, though, "the line between measures
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional action and measures that
make substantive changes in the governing law is not easy to dis-
cern. 3 25 Indeed, Morgan's discussion of this second rationale referred
to Congress' institutional competence,3 26 an interesting observation
in light of the congressional law-interpreting function that that ra-
tionale is thought to embrace.
320 See, e.g., Vergee, supra note 60, at 671-79 (providing examples of legislative rever-
sals of Supreme Court decisions enunciating constitutional doctrine). Professor Vergeer
also cites one example of a statute restricting a right found by the Court: The law Congress
enacted in the aftermath of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reinstating a more
flexible standard for judging the voluntariness of a confession. See Vergeer, supra, at 674.
The viability of the idea that Congress can restrict a Court-found constitutional right as
easily as it can expand one is now in doubt after Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432
(2000), in which the Court held that Miranda's confession rule was constitutionally based
and could not be overruled by a legislative act.
321 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
322 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
323 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's exposition of the Con-
stitution is itself the law of the land).
324 For a notable exception, see Vergeer, supra note 60, at 693-96 (arguing that these
two differences are more the product of post-Morgan commentary than the text or reason-
ing of the opinion itself).
325 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). See generally Araiza, supra note 300 (discussing an
analogous line-drawing difficulty in the context of normal statutes).
326 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966).
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C. A Third Cut: The Nature of the Equal Protection Guarantee
A third cut at our intuition, informed by our progress so far,
should also focus on the kind of issue on which Congress was legislat-
ing but from a slightly different perspective. This approach focuses on
the type of constitutional right Congress is attempting to affect
through its Section 5 power. The key distinction here is between equal
protection rights and other rights found in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Equal protection is an enormously powerful tool. In contrast to
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which simply protects certain fundamental interests (interpreted
quite narrowly since the Slaughter-House Cases),327 and the Due Process
Clause, which protects only life, liberty, and property interests,3 28 the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits any government action that dis-
criminates invidiously, regardless of the importance of the interest.329
Thus, the military's eligibility rules for dependents' benefits,33 0 a city's
distribution of contracting business,331 its regulation of advertising on
trucks,3 32 and even its singling out of an individual homeowner with
regard to utility connections333 all raise equal protection concerns.
While the other Fourteenth Amendment guarantees demarcate par-
ticular freedoms or interests government cannot intrude on, equal
protection is a broad command of equal, or fair, treatment across
every sphere of government action.33
The breadth of the equal protection guarantee suggests that
Congress should have broader discretion to "enforce" it compared
with other Fourteenth Amendment rights. At base this might have to
do with the character of the rights guaranteed. Concepts such as "lib-
32 See generally 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
32 Compare, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 671-75 (1999) (refusing to consider a business' interest in its competitor not
engaging in false advertising as a due process-protected "property" interest).
32 It should be noted that there is a strand of equal protection jurisprudence that fo-
cuses on the importance of the benefit or burden that is being distributed unequally. See
generally, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote). This Article focuses
instead on the main component of equal protection jurisprudence, which, in turn, focuses
on the identity of the group being burdened as opposed to this "fundamental rights"
strand.
30 See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
31 See generally City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
332 SeegenerallyRy. Express Agency v. People of State of N.Y., 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
33 See Vil. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 566 (2000) (allowing assertion of
equal protection claim by a class of one).
334 See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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erty interests," "cruel and unusual punishment," or "free exercise of
religion" have as much legal as empirical meaning. For example, as
laypersons we might call many things "cruel" that the Court would not
consider "cruel and unusual. '335 By contrast, the constitutional re-
quirement of equal or fair treatment may be more readily compre-
hensible as a non-legal matter. In other words, whatever one might
think about the reasonableness of a distinction between a lay person's
understanding of "cruelty" and what the Court considers "cruel and
unusual punishment," it is surely much more difficult to justify a dif-
ference between lay and legal understandings of fairness or equality.
Indeed, this difference is suggested by the very vacuousness of the
term "equal protection" (vacuous since all legislation classifies) and
the strong pull political process theory has had in the equal protec-
tion area, both of which suggest that an inherently legal, or special-
ized, definition of equality simply does not exist.336 To be blunt:
"Cruel and unusual punishment" may be a term of art; "equality" is
much less so.
In turn, equality's less specialized meaning potentially justifies a
wider berth for legislative assistance in informing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Thus, while the City of Boerne Court might have been
justified in considering RFRA an illegitimate congressional usurpation
of the Court's power to interpret the Constitution, there may be less
reason for the Court to reject congressional attempts to give meaning
to the Equal Protection Clause's promise of equality. Congress might
not be able to create a privilege or immunity or expand the meaning
of free religious expression,33 7 but Congress still might be able to de-
35 It should be noted, though, that often the Court will essentially ask what "we" think
about these terms when it decides their meanings. See generally, e.g., Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited the execution of a person who was fifteen years old when he committed a capital
crime in large part because of a societal consensus against executions of persons that
young).
336 Political process theory is normally thought to have originated in the famous Foot-
note 4 of United States v. Carolene Prodncts, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and to have been
most fully expanded into a theory byJohn Hart Ely. See generallyJoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Ironically, Carolene Products was a
substantive due process case; still, Footnote 4's focus on legislative lassifications clearly
suggested the theory's ultimate home in the Equal Protection Clause.
37 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religions Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhonse hder Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDozo L. REv. 357, 387-
96 (1994) (arguing that Congress should be allowed less legislative leeway when altering
the scope of a Bill of Rights provision incorporated against the states via the Due Process
Clause as compared with the equal protection guarantee). On the other hand, Congress
has wide latitude to create property and liberty interests, the deprivation of which requires
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termine what constitutes invidious discrimination. Indeed, as noted
above, Morgan's discussion of Congress' determination that the denial
of voting rights to Puerto Ricans constituted invidious discrimination
included a reference to congressional competence. 338 More generally,
Morgan cited a variety of issues or concerns that the Court concluded
were for legislative assessment and weighing:
[T] he risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in govern-
mental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state re-
striction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the
evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and
the nature and significance of the state interests that would
be affected by the nullification of the English literacy re-
quirement as applied to residents who have successfully
completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school.33 9
The important point here is that these factors share a common-
sense basis in the amount of equality that is appropriate and feasible
in a given context. The point is not that the existence of these factors
requires a weighing of competing considerations; in general, balanc-
ing tests may well include factors that courts are uniquely qualified to
judge given the existence of extrinsic aids to identify and consider
those factors.m° But what extrinsic aids govern the equality determina-
tion made in the statute upheld in Morgan? If there are none, or few,
satisfaction of the guarantee of procedural due process. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (accepting the propo-
sition that Congress may create property interests and then, under Section 5, legislate
against their deprivation without due process); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571,
572 (1972) (explaining the theory behind legislative creation of property interests). In
many ways, though, procedural due process is very different from its substantive cousin,
with the former's rules deriving in large part from the different political dynamic at work
when Congress grants or deprives a property interest to an entire class and when it author-
izes government bodies to take away such interests on a piecemeal basis. Compare Arnett v.
Kennedy; 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (plurality opinion) (arguing that if Congress creates a
property interest it should be able to attach it to a condition that its deprivation can be
accomplished without a hearing), with id. at 164 (PowellJ., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment in part) and id. at 171 (White, J., dissenting) (both criticizing the
plurality's theory); see also Araiza, supra note 300, at 1137 n.290.
38 See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
9 384 U.S. 641,653 (1966).
34o See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Corp. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-57 (1986)
(determining the legality of adjudications conducted by non-Article III federal tribunals
based on a balancing of factors, including the character of the right adjudicated as public
or private and the degree to which the non-Article III court exercises powers typically asso-
ciated with a court).
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the argument should naturally follow that Congress' enforcement
power should correspondingly expand.
D. ENDA and Section 5
Thus, the equal protection guarantee is broad and based on a
constitutional principle that is less susceptible than most to legal de-
termination and reasoned explication. For these reasons, it is also
fluid and especially susceptible to social change. Sexual orientation
discrimination provides a striking example. What was once thought to
be perfectly reasonable discrimination against "perverts" and, later,
people with serious mental illness has come to be understood as in-
appropriate status-based discrimination, explainable, if at all, only as
an expression of moral disapproval irrelevant to the conduct of "an
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society. 341
The fluidity of society's conceptions of appropriate and inappro-
priate classifications provides another reason for allowing the legisla-
ture a broader scope for enforcing the equal protection guarantee.
This is especially the case with sexual orientation discrimination given
the complexity of our attitudes toward sexuality and gender roles. Be-
cause understanding sexual orientation discrimination requires study
and data gathering, and because equal protection may fundamentally
be a matter of social consensus on what discrimination is appropriate
or fair,342 Congress appears well suited to play a major role in deter-
mining the contours of the broad and majestic, yet vague, command
of the Equal Protection Clause.
There may be cause for concern if Congress defines those con-
tours too narrowly, so as to violate some judicially recognized floor of
protection. 343 But that is not an issue with ENDA. Instead, ENDA ap-
pears to be a classic example of Congress perceiving a new societal
concern with a particular type of discrimination and targeting the
broad command of the Equal Protection Clause toward its elimina-
tion. It does so narrowly, respecting interests (such as the right to as-
341 Romer v\ Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
342 It bears repeating that political process theory attempts to provide meaning to the
equal protection guarantee exactly by ensuring that all groups have a chance to influence
how the legislature reads that consensus with judicial protection only for those who don't
have that opportunity. See generally ELY, supra note 336.
343 See supra note 231. For a thorough analysis of Morgan's discussion of whether Con-
gress' power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment includes a power to reduce protec-
tions previously found by the courts, see Vergeer, stpra note 60, at 696-716.
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sociation) that courts have recognized as constitutionally based. If
Congress documents the problem of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, the fact that courts have not themselves had significant occasion
to consider the issue should not matter.344 To the extent that the Su-
preme Court's prior attitude should matter, though, the core concern
in Rorner v. Evans-that it is unconstitutional to burden a group for no
relevant reason-finds a close reflection in ENDA's findings, prohibi-
tions, and exemptions.
Under this analysis, ENDA should be found a valid expression of
Congress' Section 5 power.
34" Compare Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 968 (2001) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (identifying as a problem with the ADA the fact that few cases of al-
legedly unconstitutional disability discrimination had been litigated in federal court).
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